Justice Harry A. Blackmun: A Retrospective
Consideration of the Justice's Role in the
Emancipation of Women
INTRODUCTION

The emancipation of women in 1990's America is a reality, albeit an evolving one.' The growing recognition of women's socioeconomic significance and independence is a relatively recent phenomenon.2 While women today have gained a measure of respect
and equality, their advancement is not wholly attributable to divine
providence or women's valiant efforts.' Women's emancipation

owes much of its success to the noble jurisprudence of Justice
Harry A. Blackmun.' The opinions of Justice Blackmun evince a
profound reverence for women's individuality, autonomy, and social worth.' From the Justice's first major decision, Roe v. Wade,6
1 See Elizabeth F. Defeis, Equity and Equalityfor Women-Ratification of International

Covenants as a First Step, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 363 (1993) (recognizing that
while women have progressed more in social status in the last 20 years than in the past
200 years, full equality is still not a reality). Professor Defeis noted that "the legal
status of women in the United States has developed in an amazingly slow fashion." Id.
2 SeeJoEllen Lind, Symbols, Leaders, Practitioners: The Frst Women Professionals, 28
VAL. U. L. REv. 1327, 1327 (1994) (explaining the emergence of the first group of
American female professionals and its role in the battle to transform women's social
status from inferior to equal). Professor Lind recognized that, in particular, women
attorneys played a unique role in paving the way for the successes of future professional women. Id.
3 See id. Lind noted that the emergence of female professionals in the socio-political arena accompanied the widespread post-Civil War effort to improve women's social status in America. Id. Lind termed women's social evolution and ongoing battle
for equality a 'phenomena' and a 'crusade.' Id. at 1327-28 (citations omitted).
4 See Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassioninto the Province ofJudging: JusticeBlackmun and the Outsiders, 97 DicK. L. REv. 527, 527-28 (1993) (stating that Justice Blackmun's "major contribution to American law" was his sensitive treatment of the "poor,
powerless, and oppressed"). Karlan celebrates Justice Blackmun's advocacy of the
rights of insular minorities and impassioned defense of individuals' freedom of
choice. Id.
5 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (granting
women an unfettered right to jury participation by holding that gender-based peremptory challenges are prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause); UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that Tide VII and the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act proscribe employer implementation of fetal protection policies
that discriminate against women solely on the basis of women's childbearing potential); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing fear for the fate of women's
liberty and equality in light of restrictive abortion regulations that legislatures enacted
to create test cases for the courts to consider); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85, 89
(1979) (championing women's role in the workplace by striking an anachronistic gender-based classification of the Social Security Act); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153
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through his final opinion, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,7 the issue of
women's fights has been a dominant theme.' In light of Justice

Blackmun's recent retirement from the United States Supreme
Court, an examination of the Justice's role in the emancipation of
women is particularly appropriate.9
Part I of this Comment outlines Justice Blackmun's appointment to the Court. Part II examines the Justice's most controversial abortion decision and its significance in proclaiming women's
autonomy. Part III considers two of Justice Blackmun's opinions

concerning women in the workplace and explores the impact of
these decisions on women's expanding role in society. Part IV ana-

lyzes one of the Justice's decisions regarding women in the civic
arena and theorizes about its contribution to gender equality. Part
V concludes that Justice Blackmun has enriched women's lives with

an overdue and profoundly noble recognition of their social value
that has paved the road to emancipation.
I.

SETTING JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S PLACE ON THE SUPREME COURT

On April 14, 1970, in the wake of political turmoil marked by
the resignation ofJustice Abe Fortas,1 ° President Richard M. Nixon
appointed Harry A. Blackmun Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court." Justice Blackmun's subsequent confirmation marked what Nixon believed to be a victory in his crusade to
(1973) (recognizing women's fundamental privacy right to choose whether to carry a
pregnancy to term).
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
8 See supra note 5 (listing cases in which women's rights is a dominant theme).
9 See Sensitivity for Downtrodden Defines Legacy of Blackmun, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER, Apr. 7, 1994, at 15A [hereinafter Sensitivity for Downtrodden] (reflecting on the
Justice's tenure on the Court and quoting Blackmun's view of abortion as "'a step that
had to be taken as we go down the road toward the full emancipation of women"'); see
also Ruth Marcus, Blackmun Set to Leave High Court, WASH. PosT, Apr. 6, 1994, at Al
(announcing Justice Blackmun's retirement from the Supreme Court).
10 See generally LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS-A BIoGI;APHv 370-76 (1990) (detailing
the resignation ofJustice Fortas from the Supreme Court). The resignation ofJustice
Fortas culminated a period of intense investigation, media hype, and charges of impropriety in the Justice's relationship with Louis Wolfson, a financier who was eventually convicted for his involvement in illegal business dealings. Id. at 363, 369, 371,
373. President Nixon lavished the thought of Fortas's resignation, for the vacancy
would allow Nixon to nominate his own conservative choice and end liberal control of
the Court. Id. at 362, 363. On May 14, 1969,Justice Fortas delivered his terse resignation letter to ChiefJustice Earl Warren, thereby leaving the vacancy Nixon prized. Id.
at 373.
11 Michael Pollet, Harry A. Blackmun, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
1789-1978: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 3 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds.,
1980).

1178

SETON HALL LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 25:1176

restructure the Court in his own image and to temper the judicial
activism and liberalism of the Warren era. 12 What Nixon sought in
Blackmun was an advocate of judicial restraint, a strict constructionist, and a conservative like himself.' Blackmun received an
overwhelming multilateral endorsement, winning even the approval of those far outside the Nixon camp who lauded Blackmun's finely tuned legal mind and striking sense of fairness.1 4
From his early days on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Justice Blackmun earned a reputation as a flexible conservativemoderate in civil liberties matters, somewhat progressive in the
civil rights area, prosecution-favoring in criminal cases, and deferential to Congress, the President, and the states. 15 Despite his early
Id. at 3-4. The Constitution gives the President the power to nominate Judges of
the Supreme Court with the advice and two-thirds approval of the Senate. U.S.
CONSr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. For more on nomination to the Supreme Court, see CHRIsroPHER E. SMrrH, CRICAL JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND POLrrICAL CHANGE 1 (1993).
12

Blackmun was not Nixon's first choice to replace Fortas. See HENRYJ. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS-A POLrICAL HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1974). Upon the advice of Attorney General John N. Mitchell, President

Nixon first proposed Chief Judge Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Id. Haynsworth reflected the conservative values Nixon sought to
restore to the Court. Id. at 4-5. Much to Nixon's disgust, however, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary uncovered evidence of Haynsworth's financial indiscretions,
which doomed his nomination. Id. at 5. Nixon blamed anti-conservative and anticonstructionist liberals for the defeated appointment and sought to find another
strict conservative to fill the vacancy. Id. Once again, Nixon followed the advice of
John Mitchell and proposed Judge G. Harrold Carswell. Id. Carswell was a former
Florida District Court Judge and had served six months on the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Id. at 5-6. Initially, Carswell seemed "too good to be true." Id. at 6. This
image was quickly shattered by the media's discovery that Carswell was a self-proclaimed white supremacist. Id. Though Carswell's racist admission was made twenty
years earlier, the judge's attempt to retract his previous remarks was unconvincing.
Id. at 6-7. Ultimately, Senators refused to sanction mediocrity and prejudice on the
Court and struck down Carswell's appointment on April 9, 1970. Id. at 7. After two
bitter defeats, Nixon's nomination of Blackmun reflected a concerted effort by the
President to combat the staunch liberals of the media and Senate. Id. at 7, 9. Haynsworth and Carswell were both southerners, and Nixon hoped that turning north for
a candidate would bring a successful appointment. Id. at 8, 9.
13 Pollet, supra note 11, at 4.
14 Id. Blackmun's credentials earned him the support of prominent liberals in the
Senate, including Hubert Humphry, Ted Kennedy, and Walter Mondale. Id. Former
Executive Director of the American Civil liberties Union, John deJ. Pemberton, also
offered his support for Blackmun's confirmation despite Pemberton's non-alliance
with the Nixon Administration. Id. The American Bar Association's Committee on
the Federal Judiciary launched an unprecedentedly extensive investigation of Blackmun's qualifications. Id. They too sung Blackmun's praises. Id. Upon the recommendations of the ABA Committee and urging of prominent senators, the Senate
Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to confirm Harry A. Blackmun the 99th Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Id.
15 Id. at 5. Blackmun's Supreme Court opinions also reflect the Justice's deference
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public political image, Justice Blackmun resisted media attempts to
cast him in one philosophical role. 16 Justice Blackmun's refusal to
ally himself with either conservatives or liberals earned him a repu17
tation as a "swing" Justice.
Despite President Nixon's dream of securing to the Court a
justice who would mirror his own conservative propensity for strict
constructionism and opposition to civil liberties, Blackmun's trail
of decisions reflects instances of departure from Nixon's ideology.' 8 As early as 1972,Justice Blackmun questioned the principles
of judicial restraint for which he had been renowned.1 9
In spite of Justice Blackmun's reputation as a flexible conto the government. Id. at 8. Specifically in the area of sex discrimination, Justice
Blackmun yielded to government claims that sex-based statutes were intended to benefit women. See Anne E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court,
92 YALE L.J. 913, 929 & n. 78 (1983) (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 734-35 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (lamenting that the Court's
ruling "places in constitutional jeopardy any state-supported educational institution
that confines its student body ... to members of one sex, even though the State
elsewhere provides an equivalent program to the complaining applicant"); Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (supporting the constitutionality of a statutory rape law targeting only males as "a sufficiently reasoned . . .effort to control the problem at its inception"); Califano v.
Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 321 (1977) (per curiam) (Blackmun, J., joining Burger, C.J.,
concurring) (questioning whether the validity of facially discriminatory statutory
schemes should be judged on whether a given scheme can be categorized as "offensive" or "benign"); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 225-26 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
joining Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statutory scheme that makes it easier
for widows than widowers to obtain benefits should not receive strict scrutiny review
because such a scheme does not perpetuate economic disadvantage)) (other citation
omitted).
16 See Pollet, supra note 11, at 5. Challenging the press, the Justice warned, "'I've
been called a liberal and a conservative. Labels are deceiving.'" Id.
17 Freedman, supra note 15, at 929. A "swing" justice does not commit to either
position and brings personal perspectives to bear in considering the issues. Id.
18 Pollet, supra note 11, at 7-8. Blackmun's Roe v. Wade decision is the most notable example of the Justice's departure from conservative jurisprudence. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that women possess a substantive due process right in the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy). One commentator labeled the Roe opinion "the rankest kind of insupportably excessive judicial activism"
and accused Blackmun of usurping legislative authority by effectively writing a federal
abortion statute. Henry J. Abraham, Line Drawing Between Judicial Activism and Restraint: A "Centrist"Approach and Analysis, in SUPREME COURT AcIVISM AND RESTRAINT
212-13 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982).
19 Pollet, supra note 11, at 19 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755-56
(1972) (Blackmun J., dissenting)). Blackmun developed a reputation for judicial restraint during his tenure on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 8. Blacknun's
adherence to this philosophy was notably palpable in criminal and civil liberties cases.
Id. at 6, 7 (citing Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 F.2d 138, 149 (8th Cir. 1968) (upholding
capital punishment because determination of penalty's appropriateness is a policy issue best left to the legislature or executive), vacated per curiam, 398 U.S. 262 (1970) ;
In re Weitzman, 426 F.2d 439, 454 (1970) (per curiam) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
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servative, his opinions concerning gender issues reveal an emancipating liberalism.2 ° What Nixon envisioned in 1970 as a wholly
conservative appointment ultimately emerged as a liberal leap
21
down the road to gender equality.
II.

RECOGNIZING WOMEN'S PERSONAL LIBERTY. THE ABORTION
DECISION

Roe v. Wade has been hailed as Justice Blackmun's most significant Supreme Court decision. 22 The Roe opinion marked the beginning of a debate of dramatic proportions. 23 Holding that a
(declaring unconstitutional the denial of citizenship to an alien whose opposition to
war was grounded in moral precept rather than in religious belief)).
Blackmun first began to question such restraint in his dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton, in which the Justice advocated the expansion of established notions of standing under federal environmental laws. Id. at 19 (citing Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 755-56
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Rebuking the majority for its unyielding conservatism,
Blackmun remarked, "[m]ust our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so
inflexible that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and traditional
concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?"
Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 755-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). At the time, this conviction
seemed out of character for Justice Blackmun, who was generally considered to be
"imbued with the theology of judicial restraint and ... reluctant to make new law."
Pollet, supra note 11, at 19.
20 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (recognizing a woman's fundamental right to
choose whether to procure an abortion). When Nixon chose Blackmun, the President hoped his nominee would mirror the conservative philosophy of Blackmun's
childhood friend, Chief Justice Warren Burger. DAVID G. SAvAGE, TURNING RIGHrrTtE MAUNG OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 175 (1992). The press was well aware
of the long-time friendship between Blackmun and Burger and dubbed the pair the
"Minnesota Twins." Id. at 233. By the mid-70s, however, Blackmun diverged from the
philosophy of his colleague and became a vocal proponent of equal rights for blacks,
homosexuals, and women. Id. at 233-34. Blackmun's 1973 Roe v. Wade opinion, the
most controversial decision of the decade, went far afield of the Nixon-Burger conservatism. Id. at 175. One theorist saw a lesson for future presidents in this liberal swing
and cautioned: "[b] eware of moderate Republicans whose judicial philosophy is not
clear." Id. For a study on the Burger Court with a detailed analysis of its prevailing
constitutional and legal philosophies, see generally BERNARD SCHWARTz-THE ASCENT
OF PRAGMATISM, THE BURGER COURT IN ACrION (1990).
21 See SAVAGE, supra note 20, at 233-34. Liberals attribute Justice Blackmun's departure from conservatism to the Justice's growth during his early years on the bench
and his developing appreciation and expanding vision of constitutional tenets. Id. at
234. Conservatives denounce Blackmun's liberal twist as the product of the brainwashing lure of Brennan philosophy. Id. Still others propose that Nixon and the
media may have mischaracterized Blackmun and selectively chosen to ignore the
glimmer of liberalism in the Justice's early opinions. Id.

22 Pollet, supra note 11, at 13.
23 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REv. 375, 379 (1985). Justice Ginsburg proposed that the Roe
decision would have been more acceptable if the Court had limited the ruling to the
facts of the extreme statute at issue. Id. at 385; see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2812 (1992) (recognizing that nineteen years after Roe, the issue of abor-
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woman's right of personal privacy encompasses the right to obtain
an abortion, Roe v. Wade rendered unconstitutional forty-six of fifty
state abortion laws.24
Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman, filed an action challenging the Texas abortion law that criminalized the procurement or
attempt to procure an abortion other than when necessary to save
the law
the life of the woman. 25 Roe sought a judgment declaring
26
enforcement.
its
enjoining
facially unconstitutional and
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, held that the fundamental right to privacy encompasses a woman's decision
whether to carry a pregnancy to term. In so holding, the Justice
invalidated the Texas statute's wholesale proscription of abortion
at any stage of pregnancy and the statutes' overbroad exception for
saving the life of the mother.28 Further, Justice Blackmun defined
a trimester framework: during the first trimester, the termination
decision rests ultimately with the woman and her physician; after
the first trimester, the state may regulate, and even prohibit, abortion for reasons reasonably related to maternal health; at the point
of fetal viability, a state may further regulate abortion to protect
29
the potential life of the fetus.

tion as a fundamental liberty interest remains controversial, provoking widespread
and sustained debate). For a criticism of Roe's extension of the privacy right to unprecedented and ambiguous lengths, see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 922 (1973) (citations omitted).
24 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Pollet, supranote 11, at 13. For an extensive list of criminal
abortion statutes in force in 1973, see Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2.
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
26 Id. Roe averred that the statute was vague and infringed upon her personal
privacy rights under the "First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments."
Id. Roe further challenged that the absence of a threat to her life precluded her from
legally obtaining an abortion in Texas, and that the costs of traveling to another state
to undergo the procedure were prohibitive. Id.
The district court held that the Texas statute was unconstitutionally vague and
infringed too broadly upon Roe's Ninth Amendment rights. Id. at 122. The court,
however, finding that injunctive relief was inappropriate, offered only a declaratory
remedy. Id.
Roe appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court, contesting the district
court's ruling on injunctive relief. Id. District Attorney Wade, for the state of Texas,
filed a cross-appeal from the lower court's order of declaratory relief. Id. The
Supreme Court, per Justice Blackmun, first addressed the procedural questions and
found Roe's direct appeal appropriate. Id. at 123. TheJustice further held that Roe's
natural termination of her pregnancy did not render her case moot, explaining that
suits concerning pregnancy are exceptions to the general rule requiring an actual
controversy at the review stage. Id. at 125. Blackmun reasoned that pregnancy is a
condition "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
27 Id. at 153.
28 Id. at 163-64.
29 Id. at 164-65. While recognizing the fundamental privacy right encompassing
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First, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Constitution
does not literally enumerate a right of privacy, but cited a line of
decisions, beginning in 1891, in which the Supreme Court recognized that the Constitution guarantees a right to certain zones of
personal privacy. 0 Whether rooted in the Ninth Amendment, as
asserted by the district court, or in the Fourteenth Amendment, as
Justice Blackmun believed, the Justice announced that the right of
personal privacy is expansive enough to protect a woman's choice
to seek an abortion.3 1
Justice Blackmun recognized, however, that this right to
choose whether to carry a pregnancy to term is not absolute.3 2 The
Justice declared that at some point during pregnancy, state interests in both maternal health and the potential life embodied in the
fetus become so compelling that regulation of abortion is justified.3 3 First, Justice Blackmun held that the concern for maternal
the abortion decision, Justice Blackmun conceded that this privacy right is not absolute. Id. at 154-55. Where fundamental rights are at issue, the Justice noted, state
interference with such rights may be justified by a "'compelling state interest.'" Id. at
155 (citations omitted). In the abortion context, Justice Blackmun identified two
compelling state interests that arise at different points in the course of a pregnancy.
the interest in protecting the health of pregnant women and the interest in protecting the potential human life embodied in the fetus. Id. at 162. TheJustice concluded
that the state's interest in the mother's health does not become "compelling" until
the completion of the first trimester. Id. at 163. The Justice explained that this is
because abortion mortality during the first trimester is less than mortality in natural
childbirth. Id. The state's interest in potential life, Justice Blackmun proffered, becomes "compelling" at the point of fetal viability. Id. The Justice resolved that, at this
point, the fetus is capable of having a meaningful life outside of the womb. Id.
30 Id. at 152-53 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
The Justice noted that the Court has historically grounded such a right in the First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, in the Bill of Rights penumbra, and in the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 152. (citations omitted).
31 Id. at 153. Next, Justice Blackmun recognized that a state's wholesale ban of
abortion might pose serious risks to the mental and physical health of the woman. Id.
The Justice proffered that such concerns were best left to the woman and her doctor.
Id.
32 Id. at 153-54. To support this proposition, the Justice pointed to prior opinions
in which the Supreme Court recognized a privacy right but declined to leave it unqualified or unbounded. Id. (citations omitted). The Justice also cited a series of
state and federal decisions that recognized a need for limitation on the privacy right.
Id. at 154-55 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun reiterated that a degree of state
regulation in protected privacy areas is appropriate. Id. at 155.
33 Id. at 155-56. Next, Justice Blackmun considered the amount of latitude to be
afforded state action that restricts the privacy right. Id. at 155. Citing a string of prior
Supreme Court decisions, the Justice affirmed that government restraints on the fundamental right of privacy must be narrowly drawn to achieve the state's compelling
interest. Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted). The Justice was unwilling to accept appellants' claim that no state interest justified limiting a woman's privacy right. Id. at 156.
Blackmun was equally unwilling to adopt appellee's broad assertion that protection of
potential life from the point of conception is a sufficiently compelling state interest.
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health becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester.3 4 The
Justice thus determined that prior to this point, a woman and her
physician must be free *to reach an abortion decision without government intrusion.35 Second, Justice Blackmun held that the state
interest in potential life becomes compelling at viability, when the
fetus is capable of "meaningful life" outside the womb.3 6 The Justice declared that protection of a viable fetus may justify a state's

proscription of abortion, except when essential to preserve maternal life or health."

After articulating the legal principles, Justice Blackmun ap-

plied those standards to the Texas statute. 8 The Justice concluded
that the statute's failure to differentiate among abortions sought at

various stages of pregnancy and the overbroad exception for "saving" the woman's life rendered the law unconstitutional. 9
Id. Moreover, the Justice declined to accept appellee's unprecedented proposition
that a fetus is a "person" deserving of Fourteenth Amendment protection. Id. at 15659 (citations omitted). Blackmun reasoned that the law has never accorded the unborn "personhood" status, and that judicial determination of the point at which life
begins would be inappropriate considering the continuing debate among those
skilled to address such a question. Id. at 157, 158, 159. The Justice adhered, however,
to the belief that at some point the state acquires a valid interest in a woman's pregnancy. Id. at 159.
34 Id. at 163. The Justice explained that until this point, mortality in childbirth
may be greater than mortality in abortion. Id.
35 Id. Conversely, the Justice declared that following the compelling point, a state
may choose to regulate the abortion practice to the extent that any imposed restraints
reasonably serve the interest in maternal health or life. Id.
56 Id.
37 Id. at 163-64.
38 Id. at 164.
39 Id. After this announcement, Blackmun proffered that the instant decision was
consistent with medical and legal history, as well as with contemporary social concerns. Id. at 165. The Justice stressed that the decision permits the state to impose
restraints on a woman's abortion decision commensurate with the state's interests. Id.
Further, Justice Blackmun reminded that prior to the compelling points, the abortion
decision must remain a medical one for which the physician bears basic responsibility.
Id. at 166.
Lastly, Justice Blackmun explained that striking only the statutory provision
which allowed abortion to save the mother's life would leave the state with an unconstitutionally wholesale ban on abortion. Id. Believing that the Texas authorities
would heed the instant decision, Blackmun found it unnecessary to determine
whether the lower court's denial of injunctive relief was appropriate. Id. Thus, based
on the foregoing reasons, Justice Blackmun affirmed in part and reversed in part the
decision of the district court. Id. at 166-67.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, joined the Court's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 170-71 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Justice pointed to
years of Fourteenth Amendment case law and urged that past decisions demanded
the logical extension of the privacy right to embrace abortion choice. Id. at 167-70
(Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
After denouncing the Texas statute as an affront to the announced privacy right,
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Justice Stewart addressed the proposed state interests. Id. at 170 (Stewart, J., concurring). First, the Justice questioned whether the legitimate concerns for the health
and safety of the mother and potential life could withstand the level of scrutiny afforded state action that violates fundamental rights. Id. The Justice acknowledged
the validity of these state concerns and admitted that at some point they warrant state
infringement of a woman's privacy. Id. That notwithstanding, the Justice declined to
further explore the legitimacy of such state action, reasoning that such legislation was
not before the Court. Id. Focussing on the instant matter, Justice Stewart echoed the
majority's rejection of appellee's overbroad interest in saving the mother's life. Id. at
170-71 (StewartJ., concurring). TheJustice concluded that such a wide-open interest
could notjustify an otherwise wholesale abrogation of a woman's right to due process.
Id.
Justice Rehnquist, in a highly charged dissent, rebuked the majority for its unprecedented interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist professed that neither the privacy generally
accorded medical abortions nor the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment are
the same species of privacy defined by the majority. Id. The Justice noted, however,
that if the Court intended to define privacy as a form of Fourteenth Amendment
liberty, then such a claim was well-supported by precedent. Id. Moreover, Justice
Rehnquist agreed with Justice Stewart's observation that the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause encompasses more than the Bill of Rights guarantees. Id. at 17273 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist clarified, such liberty is
not absolute, but only free of invasion without due process. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
Further, the Justice explained that state infringements of personal liberty have
historically been held to a rational basis standard, which requires merely a rational
link between the infringement and the state's concern. Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
the Justice acknowledged that the Due Process Clause does restrict government action, but only to a limited degree. Id. Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist declared that
the majority's total prohibition of any restraints on first trimester abortions could not
survive the rational basis test. Id. Moreover, the Justice challenged that the majority's
substitution of strict scrutiny for the proper standard was an inappropriate transposition of Equal Protection theory to a Due Process issue. Id. at 173, 174 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The Justice dedared this action a judicial usurpation of legislative authority. Id. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Next, Justice Rehnquist chastised the Court for apparently ignoring that most
states have restricted abortion practices for nearly a hundred years. Id. The Justice
posited that these nationwide restraints and the ever-present abortion debate undermine the majority's assertion that the abortion right is fundamental to the American
conscience. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, Justice Rehnquist proffered that the
Amendment's authors were 'well aware of the abortion statutes in force at the time
and did not intend to rob the states of the authority to enact laws governing abortion.
Id. at 174-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Thus, unyielding in scrutiny, Justice Rehnquist further condemned the majority's finding of a Fourteenth
Amendment right never contemplated by the Amendment's framers. Id. at 177
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In a final attempt to reconcile the majority's decision with constitutional theory,
Justice Rehnquist examined the Court's sweeping invalidation of the Texas statute.
Id. For the sake of argument, the Justice accepted the premise that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Roe. Id. The Justice noted, however, the majority's
concession that, in later stages of pregnancy, those once unconstitutional provisions
might be permissible. Id. Thus, Justice Rehnquist reminded that a statute held invalid as to one individual, but not wholly unconstitutional, must not be struck down. Id.
at 177-78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Instead, the justice declared,
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In the years since Roe, the notion of women's qualified right to
abortion has become axiomatic despite the opposition that the issue has engendered.' Only three years after the seminal Roe decision, Justice Blackmun again considered the question of an
abortion statute's constitutionality in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.-41 Invoking Roe, Justice Blackmun reiterated the fundamental
privacy right that encompasses the abortion decision.4" The Justice
extended the Roe doctrine to invalidate a statutory provision requir-

precedent demands that such a law be held unconstitutional only with regard to the
case at hand. Id. at 178 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Because Justice
Rehnquist found the majority's decision an unprecedented interpretation and application of Fourteenth Amendment principles, the Justice respectfully dissented. Id.
40 See Pollet, supranote 11, at 13-14. The concept of abortion choice as a qualified
privacy right remains a topic of national and international debate. See Selina K. Hewitt, Note, Hodgson v. Minnesota: ChippingAway at Roe v. Wade in the Aftermath of
Webster, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 955, 1009-10 (1991) (exploring the movement toward narrowing and eventually overturning Roe); Barbara Crossette, Population Meeting Opens
with Challenge to the Right, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 6, 1994, at Al (discussing the World Population Conference, at which the Clinton Administration was under fire by abortion
opponents who challenged that the Administration's stance on abortion encouraged
the practice as a means of combatting the global population explosion).
41 428 U.S. 52 (1976). Two physicians and Planned Parenthood Corporation filed
suit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Attorney General of Missouri and
Circuit Attorney of St. Louis, challenging the constitutionality of the revised Missouri
abortion statute. Id. at 56, 57, 57-58. Specifically, the plaintiffs attacked: (1) the
statutory provisions defining viability and requiring a woman's consent, spousal consent, and parental consent for unmarried minors; (2) the statute's requirement that
physicians exercise care to preserve fetal life, neglect of which gave rise to criminal
and civil penalties; and (3) the statute's provisions concerning infant survivors of
abortion, saline amniocentesis procedures, and recordkeeping and reporting requirements. Id. at 58-59. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction of
the enforcement of the law. Id. at 57. The district court upheld the statute, striking
only a portion of the physician care provision as overbroad. Id. at 59. The plaintiffs
appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 60.
42 Id. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, affirmed in part and reversed in
part the decision of the district court. Id. at 84.
Justice Blackmun first affirmed the definition of viability, reasoning that it was
consistent with Roe. Id. at 63. Second, the Justice declared the woman's consent provision constitutional. Id. at 67. Justice Blackmun reasoned that the central role of
women in abortion justified the state's interest in mandating women's prior consent.
Id. Third, Justice Blackmun struck the requirements of spousal consent and parental
consent requirement for minors, finding the provisions unconstitutional in their delegation of decision-making power to someone other than the woman and her doctor.
Id. at 70, 75. Fourth, the Justice struck the provision forbidding saline amniocentesis
after twelve weeks of pregnancy. Id. at 79. Justice Blackmun denounced the provision
as an "unreasonable or arbitrary regulation" aimed at discouraging abortion. Id.
Next, the Justice upheld the reporting and recordkeeping provisions, finding them
useful and non-burdensome. Id. at 80-81. Finally, Justice Blackmun struck the physician care requirement as impermissibly broad in its failure to distinguish between the
level of care afforded pre- and post-viability fetuses. Id. at 83.
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ing spousal consent to abortion.43
Justice Blackmun specifically addressed the state's claim that
its spousal consent provision reflected the government's view of
marriage as an institution in which significant decisions require bilateral input.44 The Justice was sensitive to the significance of marriage, husbands' profound concerns regarding their wives'
pregnancies, and the probable impact of the abortion decision on
the marital union.45 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun was unwilling
to perpetuate the intolerable notion of men's single-handed control over decisions affecting the family.46 The Justice reasoned that
upholding the consent requirement would effectively grant husbands veto power over their wives' choices regarding whether to
carry a pregnancy to term.47 Justice Blackmun refused to submit
women's ultimate act of autonomy to the final approval of their
husbands. 4 Nowhere, concluded the Justice, does the Constitution sanction the government's grant of unilateral power to husbands when the government itself does not possess such deadhand
control.4 9

The issue of control is a palpable factor permeating the Roe
and Danforth decisions.5 ° Justice Blackmun's clear delegation to
Id. at 71. The spousal consent provision of the Missouri statute provided: " [n] o
abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
except... [w]ith the written consent of the woman's spouse, unless the abortion is
certified by a licensed physician to be necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother." Id. app. at 85.
44 Id. at 68. Plaintiffs challenged this theory, charging that the spousal consent
requirement was tantamount to granting husbands veto power over their wives' decisions, regardless of the actual paternity of the fetuses. Id. at 68-69 (citations omitted).
45 Id. at 69-70 (citations omitted).
46 Id. at 70 & n.11 (citation omitted).
43

47

Id.

Id. The Justice acknowledged the validity of Missouri's goal of engendering mutual participation in marital affairs, but questioned whether according husbands veto
power over their wives' abortion decisions would serve this aim. Id. at 71. Stressing
that women carry the fetuses and are more directly affected by pregnancy than their
husbands, the Justice declared that when partners cannot agree on the abortion issue,
the scales tip in women's favor. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
49 Id. at 70 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). Justice Blackmun
reminded that the privacy right implicitly grants the individual freedom from unwarranted government intrusion into decisions as fundamentally personal as the choice
to have children. Id. at 70 n.11 (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
50 See Andrea M. Sharrin, Note, PotentialFathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is
Not a Man's Castle, 55 BRooK. L. REv. 1359, 1400-03, 1404 (1990) (asserting that recognizing fathers' rights in the abortion decision would violate the privacy concepts inherent in Roe and Danforth). After examining Roe v. Wade and cases asserting paternal
rights surrounding the abortion decision, Sharrin concluded that subverting women's
rights to those of fathers violates women's equal protection rights and constitutes the
most vile form of sex discrimination. Id. at 1403-04. Sharrin vehemently asserted that
48
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women of qualified control over their own bodies can be viewed
from two perspectives-one moral and one philosophical.5" From
a religious and moral standpoint, Roe and Danforth are highly suspect.52 They present an irreconcilable conflict for persons of firm
but supreligious conviction who fundamentally oppose abortion
53
port the Justice's recognition of women's autonomy.
Putting aside religious concerns, the decisions in Roe and Danforth are philosophical gems.'M Viewing Roe from a strictly theoretical angle, one must credit Justice Blackmun with great insight for
recognizing that the right to obtain an abortion falls within the
privacy right implicit in this nation's concept of liberty.5 5 One
placing restrictions on the right to abortion undermines women's right to self-determination. Id. at 1401 (citations omitted). Moreover, Sharrin noted, '[t~he right to
equal citizenship encompasses the right "to take responsibility for choosing one's own
future .... [T]o be a person is to respect one's own ability to make responsible

choices in controlling one's own destiny, to be an active participant in society rather
than an object."'" Id. at 1402 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
51 See SAVAGE, supra note 20, at 236-37. The reaction of both advocates and opponents to Roe was tremendous. See id. Women's rights proponents have praised Justice
Blackmun's liberating genius. Id. at 236. They attribute much of the Justice's prowomen philosophy to his wife, who has been described as a feminist. Id. at 237. By
contrast, right-to-life supporters denounce the Justice's philosophy as a moral outrage. Id. at 236.
52 See id. Anti-abortion organizations exploited the questionable moral foundation
of Justice Blackmun's abortion stance. Id. at 237. In response to Roe, Blackmun received death threats from one religious group, the "Army of God." Id. Other abortion opponents labeled Blackmun the "'Butcher of Dachau,' 'Pontius Pilate,' 'King
Herod,' [and] a child murderer." Id.
Other vocal dissenters have rigorously denounced the Justice's refusal to recognize the fetus as a person. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 480, 483 (1990) (quotation omitted) ("The
equality argument also ignores the fact that women are not the only traditionally powerless group whose interests are at stake here. . . . '[N]o fetuses sit in our legislatures.'"). Koppelman argues that no one can prove or disprove the personhood of a
fetus and that denying women the choice to abort is tantamount to slavery in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. at 483-85.
53 See Alan Brownstein & Paul Dau, The ConstitutionalMorality of Abortion, 33 B.C. L.
Ruv. 689, 697-98 (1992) (examining abortion from a moral perspective by addressing
the arguments of pro-life and pro-choice proponents and the struggle between privacy rights and the alleged immorality of abortion). For further reading on the moral
struggle associated with abortion, see generally James R. Bowers & Ummuhan Turgut,
Classic Liberalism, the Constitution and Abortion Policy: Can Government Be Both Pro-Choice
and Anti-Abortion?, 17 U. DAYrON L. Rxv. 1 (1991) (discussing abortion as a "clash of
absolutes" and a continuing tension between the poles of fetal life and female selfgovernance).
54 But see Reva Siegel, Reasoningfrom the Body: A HistoricalPerspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 262, 263 (1992) (recognizing that scholars have questioned the solidity of Roe's constitutional
foundation).
55 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (detailing the reasoning behind Roe's
holding that the fundamental right to privacy includes the abortion decision). A full
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must also applaud Blackmun's enunciation of the trimester framework and women's abortion rights therein.'
appreciation of the impact of the Roe decision on contemporary constitutional philosophy requires an understanding of abortion history. See id. at 117. Justice Blackmun
prefaced the Roe opinion with such an examination. Id. During the era of the Persian
Empire, anti-abortionists were vocal and abortions were punished harshly. Id. at 130
(citation omitted). Ancient Greece and Rome were battlegrounds for disputes over
the legality of abortion. Id. (citation omitted). Although the procedure was freely
practiced, anti-abortionists generally grounded their protests in the theory that abortion violated a father's right to his progeny. Id. (citation omitted).
The English common law did not stray far from its ancient predecessors. Id. at
132-33. Drawing on philosophical, religious, civil, and canon law notions of the point
at which life begins, English theorists narrowed the point to somewhere between conception and birth, with little agreement therein as to the exact moment of animation.
Id. at 133-34 & n.22 (citations omitted). Whatever the point of animation, or "quickening," as early physicians called it, common law thinkers generally agreed that prequickening, the fetus was still part of the woman and pregnancy termination was thus
not criminal. Id. at 134. The degree of criminality accorded the termination of a
quick fetus at English common law remains in dispute. Id. at 134-35. Decisions of
American courts relying on English law indicate that abortion, at any time during the
pregnancy term, was probably never regarded as a common law offense. Id. at 135-36
(citations omitted). English statutory law wavered in its perspective on the legality of
abortion, moving from making the termination of a quick fetus a capital crime to
eventually permitting the procedure according to statutory guidelines. Id. at 136-38
(citations omitted).
American law echoed English doctrine well into the mid-nineteenth century,
when the quickening notion gradually began to lose force and most states made abortion a serious offense carrying stiff penalties. Id. at 138-39 (citations omitted). By the
mid-twentieth century, a majority of states prohibited all abortions but those necessary
to preserve the woman's life. Id. at 139. By the time of Roe v. Wade, nearly all fifty
states had criminal abortion statutes on the books. Pollet, supra note 11, at 13. In
light of this historical evolution, Justice Blackmun remarked that abortion practice
engendered less opposition throughout ancient and common law times than it did in
1973. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140. TheJustice thus construed women's past right to abort as
grounds for resurrection of this right. Id. at 140-41.
For further discussion on the impact and soundness of Roe, see Mark E. Chopko,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: A Path to ConstitutionalEquilibrium, 12 CAMPBELL L. REv. 181, 220 (1990) (claiming that Roe upset the legal and political balance
on abortion that was beginning to evolve in this country); see also Koppelman, supra
note 52, at 480-85 (challenging that the Court's grounding of the abortion right in
the Fourteenth Amendment was unsound and proposing that the Thirteenth Amendment provides a more defensible basis).
56 See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 271-72 (1979) (noting
that Justice Blackmun looked to medicine in developing the trimester framework,
considering the manner in which doctors divided the stages of pregnancy). Justice
Blackmun's trimester framework was not the original formula proposed by the Justice.
See id at 271-76 (describing the different schemes that Justice Blackmun considered
in drafting the Roe decision). In the initial copy of Blackmun's Roe draft, the Justice
placed the point of compelling state interest at viability. Id. at 273. Justice Brennan
rejected this framework because it effectively permitted unrestricted abortions up to
viability, or the end of the second trimester. Id. at 273, 274. On Justice Brennan's
suggestion, Justice Blackmun revamped the pregnancy structure into three periods
and assigned various degrees of state interest to each. Id. at 274-75. Moreover, after
considering the suggestions ofJustice Marshall, Justice Blackmun arrived at the final
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Equally deserving of approbation, but seemingly lost amidst

the more vocalized of Blackmun's praises, is the liberating
resonance that the Justice's Roe decision sounded for women. 7
What was received in 1973 as purely an extension of the Due Process Clause was, in retrospect, the first victory cry for women in the
fight to claim emotional and legal independence in a male-dominated world.5 Roe offered hope on a much broader scale than reformula: during the first trimester, the state has no compelling interest, thus no government interference with abortion is permissible; during the second trimester, Justice Blackmun proposed that state interest grows and reasonable abortion regulation
is allowed for the purpose of protecting maternal health; during the third trimester,
the Justice submitted that abortion regulation, including proscription, is constitutional due to the state's compelling interest in protecting potential life. Id. at 275-76.
With this formula, the viability threshold was eliminated and the reins drawn in on
governmental control over second trimester abortions. Id. at 275.
Viability as a pivotal point was rendered unworkable by advances in modem science. Id. at 273-74. Advances in medical technology could move the point of viability
to earlier stages in pregnancy, thus reducing the period in which abortion is a legally
available option. Id. at 273-74, 275. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall encouraged Justice
Blackmun to return to the viability arrangement. Id. at 275. Justice Marshall feared
that indigent women in rural areas would suffer under the new trimester framework
because they would not likely see a physician within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy. Id. The viability mark, Justice Marshall submitted, would better serve the
needs of poor rural women because the point of viability would be established later in
those areas where medical technology was not highly advanced. Id. Justice Blackmun
respected Justice Marshall's concerns and incorporated them into the final trimester
draft. 1d.
57 See Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 110-12 (1989)
(recognizing that the appeal of Roes privacy analysis lies in its liberation of women
from sexual and social oppression); see also Sensitivity for Downtrodden, supra note 9, at
15A (quoting the Justice's view of Roe as "'a step that had to be taken as we go down
the road toward the full emancipation of women'").
58 See Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the Abortion-FundingCases to Fundamental-RightsAnalysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. RExv. 721, 721-23 (1981) (noting that Roe v. Wade liberated women from encroachments on their rights of privacy and autonomy, but that subsequent Supreme Court decisions immediately began gnawing away at those freedoms).
Though the Roe decision was, from Blackmun's perspective, firmly rooted in precedent, it was the first official abortion endorsement demonstrating a respect for women's decision-making and self-governing capacities. See David Von Drehle, 'Roe"
Opinion Reshaped Nation's Public and Private Life, WAsH. POST, Apr. 7, 1994, at A10
(quoting Kate Michelman of the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action
League on Roe v. Wade- "'It was probably the most important decision affecting women and their role, their autonomy, their dignity .... [Roe] played a central role in
our ability to win equality and respect'"). To appreciate the magnitude of the Roe
decision, one must necessarily understand the subservient role accorded the female
throughout history. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 786
& n.15 (1993) (quoting Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 Wall. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)). Women have long been viewed as objects of men's protection, devoid
of independent legal identity, and relegated to the harmonious sphere of home and
hearth. Id. at 786 n.15 (quoting BradwelL 16 Wall. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring)). Nature and religion were used to justify women's restricted social status, and
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productive freedom-it pulled respect within women's grasp and
promised recognition of women as independent beings. 5 9 By

granting women control over their own reproductive choices,
Blackmun took the first step in freeing women to shape their own
destinies.6 °
Danforth affirmed Roe's emancipation of women. 6 1 Blackmun's
invalidation of the spousal consent mandate marked a major turning point in women's self-governance, for it signified a rite of passage from the little girl world of obedience into the untrammeled
territory of individual decision-making.62 Though facially Roe and
Danforth spoke only of reproductive freedom, women who heard
their message heard more than just the articulation of a new privacy right-they heard the promise of a bright future.63
the idea of women in the workplace was regarded as repulsive to the family structure
in which the Divine Creator had assigned women the noble mission of wife and
mother. Id. (quoting Bradwel4 16 Wall. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring)). Whatever
the rationale for subjugating women, the prevailing common law view discouraged
women from participating in morally-debasing public life. Id. (quoting Bradwell, 16
Wall. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring)). Common law thinkers reasoned that the
.natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex" rendered
women unsuitable for, if not incapable of, performing civil activities. Id. (quoting
Bradwel, 16 Wall. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring)). Remnants of this narrow view
spilled over into modern American jurisprudence, but were met with increasing disfavor as some courts and justices began to question the historical notions that had conscribed women to home life. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 &
n.13 (1973) (describing the "unfortunate history of sex discrimination" in the United
States and that " [as] a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually
became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes" that compared
to such distinctions made on the basis of race during the pre-Civil War era).
59 SeeJane E. Larson, "Women UnderstandSo Little, They Call My Good Nature "Deceit'":
A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 CoLum. L. REv. 374, 424-31 (1993) (hailing consent and autonomy as paramount feminist values).
60 SeeWebster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("For today, the women of this Nation still
retain the liberty to control their destinies. But the signs are evident and very ominous, and a chill wind blows.").
61 See Sharrin, supra note 50, at 1386 (noting that arguments in favor of paternal
rights in the abortion decision "attempt to create a loophole ... to circumvent Roe
and Danforth.... [S]uch manufactured avenues do not exist in reality"). Sharrin
urged that Roe and Danforth are dispositive on the issue of paternal rights. Id. She
further asserted that any grant of veto power to fathers in the abortion decision would
signal a regression to invidious stereotypes in contravention of equal protection jurisprudence. Id. (citation omitted).
62 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (recognizing women's substantive due process right in the abortion decision) (1973). But see Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 587, 594 n. 30 (1991) (citation
omitted) (revealing that 36% of American adults are still unaware of the parameters
of abortion rights and believe that abortion during the first three months of pregnancy is legal only under "extreme circumstances").
63 See Von Drehle, supra note 58, at A10 (quoting Kate Michelman of the National
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Justice Blackmun's expansion of the privacy, right in Roe and
extension of the doctrine in Danforth had serious implications in
Within twenty years of
the sphere of women's independence.
these decisions, women won recognition as distinct social beings
with their own place in society.65 Justice Blackmun was a catalyst
for this much needed change.' With the promise of Roe, Justice
Blackmun planted for women the first seeds of justice, which
needed only an enlightened social consciousness to germinate.6
Although Justice Blackmun's Supreme Court colleagues were not
as eager to join in the emancipation of women, 68 the dignity and
sanctity of women's autonomy continued to gain recognition as women developed a growing appreciation of their own self worth.6 9
III.

ACKNOWLEDGING WOMEN'S CONTRIBUTORY RoLE:

THE

WORKPLACE
Six years after Roe and three years after Danforth, the value of

women as economic generators gained favorable recognition in
Califano v. Westcott.7' In Westcott, Justice Blackmun struck down, as
a violation of equal protection, a provision of the Social Security
Act that only provided for assistance where a family's primary wage
Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League on Roe v. Wade) (noting the importance of the Roe decision in terms of women's autonomy, dignity, and respect).
64 See id.
65 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (recognizing that
government may no longer define women's roles and declaring that women must now
shape their own destinies from their individual conceptions of their spiritual and social needs).
6 See id. at 2845 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation

omitted) (noting that Roe gave birth to a liberty concept that has freed women to
enjoy not only reproductive choice but also self-definition).
67 See Von Drehle, supra note 58, at A10 (acknowledging that Roe v. Wade brought
"seismic changes" in the status of women and proposing that Roe sparked a growth in
"women going to college, delaying marriage, starting careers, [and) having children
later in life").
68 See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 758, 759-60 (1993)
(holding that the aim of abortion prevention was not an "invidiously discriminatory
animus" targeted specifically at women and that anti-abortion protests incidentally
impeding women's interstate travel were not dispositive of a conspiracy to deprive
women of their rights); see also Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (affirming the fundamental
privacy right recognized in Roe, but replacing the trimester framework and strict scrutiny review in favor of a viability threshold and "undue burden" analysis).
69 See Von Drehle, supra note 58, at A10 (recognizing Roe's tremendous impact on
women's status). Justice Blackmun put abortion on the constitutional map with Roe
and abortion has since become a major point of contention in American politics. Id.
"Roe has been, depending upon your point of view, liberating, corrupting, energizing,
divisive, healthy, a holocaust." Id.
70 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
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earner was a man. 7 ' Not unlike the decision in Roe, the Justice's
Westcott opinion acknowledged the expanding social role and contributions of women.7 2
Cindy and William Westcott, unemployed parents of an infant,
sought assistance from the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare pursuant to the Social Security Act's Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program.73
Although Mrs. Westcott was the couple's principal wage earner,
her unemployment did not qualify the couple for assistance because of Mrs. Westcott's gender. 74 Challenging the regulations of
71 Id. at 80, 89.

72 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in ajudicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1185,
1203 & n. 112 (1992) (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg noted that the historical
background of the Supreme Court's gender discrimination cases was the 1961-1971
growth in women's non-domestic employment, the Civil Rights Movement, and the
surge of feminism spurred on by Simone de Beauvoir's riveting book, The Second Sex.
Id. at 1203-04 (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg further instructed that in the sex
discrimination cases, often the Supreme Court did not condemn the challenged legislation at the outset but urged lawmakers to reassess ancient perspectives instead. Id.
at 1204.
73 Westcot4 443 U.S. at 80. The Welfare Department determined that the couple
did not qualify for benefits because Mr. Westcott's previous period of employment fell
short of the duration required by the program regulations. Id.
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) offers monetary
aid to needy families with dependent children and is administered, in compliance
with federal regulations, by participating states. Id. at 79 (citations omitted); see also
42 U.S.C. §§ 601-616 (1988 & Supp. V 1994) (setting forth the current version of the
AFDC program). The AFDC program was originally implemented in 1935 to assist
families with children in need caused by the death, absence, or disability of a parent.
Westcot4 443 U.S. at 79 (citations omitted). Congress implemented temporary extensions of the AFDC program in 1961 and 1962, allowing aid to families where the
children's need was the result of a parent's unemployment. Id. (citations omitted).
Under such a provision, the term "dependent child" was expanded to include an
underprivileged child who had "'been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the unemployment . . . of a parenL'" Id. (quotation omitted) (alteration in
original).
In a 1968 revision of the Social Security Act, Congress permanently adopted the
1961 and 1962 extensions for aid to dependent children of an unemployed parent.
Id. Section 407, defining "dependent child," was amended to include an indigent
child who had "'been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment ... of his father'." Id. at 79-80 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
This amended provision is known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF). Id. at 80.
74 Westcott, 443 U.S. at 80. The other plaintiffs in Califano v. Westcott, Susan and
John Westwood, were married with an infant and sought public assistance from Medicaid. Id. at 80-81 (citations omitted). In states that participate in both AFDC and
Medicaid programs, families who qualify for AFDC aid are also entitled to Medicaid
assistance. Id. at 81 n.2 (citations omitted). The Department also denied the
Westwoods benefits based on the husband's prior length of employment. Id. at 81.
Though Susan Westwood was the couple's primary income source, her unemployment did not qualify the couple for aid. Id.
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AFDC-UF as unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of sex,
plaintiffs filed a class action suit in the District Court of Massachusetts against the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Department
of Public Welfare (Commissioner).' The plaintiffs sought an injunction and a declaration that section 407 of the Social Security
Act violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 76
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, first addressed the
Secretary's contention that the gender-based classification of section 407 did not discriminate against women as a class, but impacted equally upon one man, one woman, and their children. 7 7
Justice Blackmun found the distinction between gender-basis and
gender-bias unconvincing.78 The Justice explained that women
who were heads of households were denied aid solely because of
their gender. 7 9 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun found that section
Id.
Id. Finding that the gender dassification of § 407 was not "substantially related"
to the realization of a significant government interest, the court granted summary
judgment for the appellees. Id. at 81 (citation omitted). The court determined that
the provision's gender distinction was rooted in the outmoded belief that women in
two-parent households are not principal wage earners and that loss of their salaries
would not significantly impact their families. Id. at 81-82 (quotation omitted). Based
on this reasoning, the district court found the statute's wholly sex-based classification
unconstitutional. Id. at 82 (quotation omitted). On the issue of relief, the court determined that extension of § 407 benefits to all families otherwise meeting the criteria
would most closely serve the government's aim of aiding needy children. Id. The
district court ordered an injunction prohibiting the Commissioner from withholding
benefits from families made needy by the mother's unemployment under § 407. Id.
(citation omitted). The court also enjoined the Secretary from denying matching
funds for the payment of such benefits. Id. (citation omitted).
Initially, the Commissioner agreed with the imposed remedy, but later filed a
post-judgment motion seeking modification of the order. Id. (citation omitted). The
Commissioner challenged that the appropriate remedy would require assistance only
to families rendered needy by the unemployment of the primary income earner. Id.
(citation omitted). The district court believed that any further reformation of the
statute must be left to the legislature, and denied the motion. Id. at 83 (citation
omitted).
The Secretary and Commissioner filed separate but direct appeals to the
Supreme Court based, respectively, on the declaratory judgment and the denied motion. Id. (citation omitted). Noting probable jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, per
Justice Blackmun, consolidated the cases. Id. (citing Califano v. Westcott, 439 U.S.
1044, 1044 (1978); Sharp v. Westcott, 439 U.S. 1044, 1044 (1978)).
77 Id. at 83-84.
78 Id. at 84.
79 Id. Justice Blackmun explained that the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck
down discriminatory practices where families are awarded or denied relief based on
the gender of one parent. Id. (citing Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688, 69091 (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 209-10 (1977)) (other citation omitted). Specifically, Justice Blackmun
declared that the instant provision, like those struck down in the past, adversely af75
76
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407 discriminated on the basis of sex.8 °
fects only those families in which the wife is the primary income source. Id. (quoting
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 209).
. Justice Blackmun further declined to accept as a justification for § 407 the Secretary's assertion that the provision's adverse impact was different from the effects of
the provisions in the earlier cases. Id. at 84-85. The Justice, however, was willing to
accept the Secretary's claim that § 407 was distinguishable in that it did not ridicule
the efforts of women whose incomes contribute largely to the family budget. Id. at 85
(citing Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645; Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206-07). Nevertheless, the
Justice refused to accept this distinction as a sanction of the gender-conditional availability of public assistance. Id. Justice Blackmun viewed the Secretary's claim as an
invitation to return to the archaic notion that welfare is a privilege outside the reach
of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374
(1971)). Moreover, the Justice condemned § 407 as "more pernicious" than the gender-biased deprivations in the earlier cases because § 407 benefits are subsistence payments. Id.
80 Id. Next, Justice Blackmun addressed the Secretary's second claim that the gender classification of § 407 must be upheld because it is substantially related to the
realization of two significant government goals. Id. (citations omitted). First, the
Justice considered the purported statutory aim of aiding children who have been denied life essentials due to the unemployment of a parent. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun noted that the Secretary did not assert that the gender distinction of
§ 407 served the sustenance goal. Id. at 86 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Justice
opined that such an assertion would be without merit because families in which the
wife loses her job often need the aid as much as families in which the father is unemployed. Id.
Second,Justice Blackmun considered the statute's goal of remedying a shortcoming in the original aid program. Id. The Justice noted that the former provision was
viewed as an encouragement for fathers to abandon their families to qualify for relief.
Id. Further, the Justice explained, the gender distinction implemented in § 407 was
intended to discourage parental desertion and thereby foster family stability. Id.
ThoughJustice Blackmun recognized Congress's concern for parental abandonment,
theJustice pointed out two fatal weaknesses in the Secretary's contention that such an
objective is substantially related to the sex classification of § 407. Id. (citations omitted). First, Justice Blackmun found no evidence that the classification was structured
to remedy paternal abandonment. Id. (citing Wesenfld, 420 U.S. at 648). The Justice
reasoned that the original AFDC and the AFDC-UF programs were not gender-conditional. Id. at 86-87. Justice Blackmun ascertained that the gender classification was
part of Congress's aim to restrict eligibility and cut costs. Id. at 87 (quotation & citation omitted). Hence, the Justice concluded that Congress was perpetuating outmoded notions of the "traditional family" in which women who worked, if at all,
contributed only incidentally to the family budget. Id. at 88. The Justice found nothing to indicate that the sex-based distinction was directed at remedying paternal desertion. Id. at 88 & n.7 (citations omitted).
Addressing the second flaw in the Secretary's claim of substantial relation, Justice
Blackmun proffered that even if reducing fathers' abandonment was the aim of the
gender distinction, such a distinction failed to substantially achieve that goal. Id. at
88. The Justice pointed to the lack of evidence to support the claim that a father has
less encouragement to leave when the higher salaried wife loses her job than where
the reverse is true. Id. The Justice professed that in either circumstance, need will be
high as will incentive for the father to create eligibility by leaving. Id. at 88-89.
Justice Blackmun further rejected the Secretary's assertion that § 407 should be
upheld as "one firm step" toward reducing the abandonment incentive. Id. at 89
(quotation omitted). TheJustice reminded that the legislature may not enact step-by-
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After further examining the Secretary's claims that the gender
classification of section 407 was substantially related to legitimate
government concerns, Justice Blackmun concluded that: section
407 carried the dead weight of anachronistic gender stereotypes;
its sex-based classification was not substantially related to any signifinvalid
icant government objective; and the provision was 8therefore
1
under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.
step legislation when those steps use gender as a proxy and result in the exclusion of
one group of families from government assistance. Id. (citation omitted).
81 Id. (quotation omitted). Next, Justice Blackmun addressed the Commissioner's
claim that the unemployment of either the mother or father should qualify an indigent family for aid, but only when the qualifying parent is both unemployed and the
main income earner. Id. at 91. Justice Blackmun first explored the propriety of extending public assistance to those harmed by the exclusion versus nullifying the entire
provision. Id. at 89, 91. The Justice noted that in the past, the Court has considered
extension to be the proper course in cases concerning equal protection challenges
based on underinclusiveness. Id. at 89 (citations omitted). Further, the Justice noted
that equitable considerations as well as the Act's severability clause supported extension. Id. at 90 (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun declined to enumerate the circumstances under which nullification would be warranted. Id. The Justice reasoned
that all parties had initially agreed that extension was proper and furthered that the
propriety of nullification was not before the Court. Id. at 90, 91 (citations omitted).
The Justice also noted that because the authority to order extension was within the
district court's domain, the Supreme Court would not be inclined to address the issue
unless properly presented. Id. at 91.
Lastly, Justice Blackmun addressed the possible effects of the Commissioner's
proposed reformation. Id. The Justice posited that adoption of the Commissioner's
suggestion would result in the termination of assistance to a number of families. Id. at
92. The Justice noted that no one contested the validity of providing aid to needy
families of every unemployed father. Id. Further, the Justice held that absent proof
of invalidity, the Court would not discontinue assistance to a family just because the
out-of-work father could not establish that he was the primary wage earner. Id. The
Justice also professed that the suggested reform would entail complex statutory restructuring that would threaten separation of powers violations. Id. at 92-93 (quoting
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)). Although cognizant of the reduced
costs the Commissioner's plan would entail, the Justice did not find that factor controlling. Id. at 93. Moreover, the Justice reminded that the AFDC program is not
mandatory, and that states wishing to withdraw due to the program's added costs were
free to do so. Id. (citation omitted). Accordingly, Justice Blackmun found the district
court's simple substitution of a gender-neutral equivalent for the sex-based provision
an appropriate and equitable remedy because it avoided disturbance of the assistance
program. Id.
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the Court's
finding that § 407 violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection provision. Id.
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Notwithstanding this accord,
the Justice denounced the Court's affirmation of the extension remedy, reasoning
that it resurrects the assistance program Congress buried with the 1968 amendment
of § 407. Id. at 94 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Attempting to articulate the proper remedy, Justice Powell identified two means
by which courts may rectify statutory underinclusiveness. Id. (quoting Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). First, the justice noted that
courts may nullify the entire provision and deny benefits to all. Id. (quoting Welsh,
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Justice Blackmun's 1979 decision in Westcott reflected the
growing reality of women's changing role in modem society.8 2 Particularly, the opinion recognized the significant financial contributions women were making to the family unit, which was once under
the sole dominion of male wage-earners."3 No longer were many
women confined to maternal and domestic duties.8 4 Westcott thus
heightened social consciousness about the reality of women's success in the work force.8 5 By revising section 407 of the Social Security Act, Justice Blackmun demonstrated a commitment to
invalidating pretextual government action that perpetuates invidious notions that stigmatize women. 8
Two years following Westcott,Justice Blackmun again addressed
the issue of gender bias in the employment context.8 7 This time, a
398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). Second, the Justice stated that courts may
broaden the statute's scope to include those persons harmed by the underinclusion.
Id. (quoting Welsh, 398 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)). The ultimate duty of
courts, Justice Powell reminded, is to select that remedy which best reflects the collective policies and Congressional intent behind the statute. Id. (citing Welsh, 398 U.S. at
365-66 & n.18 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Next, Justice Powell accepted the Court's observation that the § 407 gender classification was part of an effort to restrict eligibility and cut costs. Id. (quoting id. at
87). The Justice criticized, however, that the Court's decision mandated payment of
precisely those benefits the statute intended to exclude. Id. at 94-95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, Justice Powell asserted that revision of the AFDC-UF program must be left to the legislature, who is ultimately
responsible for the program's creation and administration. I& at 95 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Further, because Congress possesses the authority to ameliorate any hardships that an injunction might yield, Justice Powell
rejected the Court's extension and would have enjoined further payments until Congress could act. Id. at 96 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82 See generally Loraine Parkinson, Note, Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law:
An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L. RFv. 604 (1989) (recognizing
law as a significant tool in effecting social change, particularly in the areas of women's
rights and civil liberties, in both America and Japan).
83 See Reva B. Siegel, Home As Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning
Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-91 (1994) (examining women's subjugation to their spouses under the antebellum laws concerning marital
property).
84 See supra note 58 (trailing women's battle for social and legal independence).
85 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Tribute to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, 43 AM. U.L. REV.
692, 692 (1994). Justice Ginsburg praised her colleague for his wisdom, noting particularly the sex discrimination cases. Id. (citing Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89
(1979)). Justice Ginsburg applauded Justice Blackmun's tenderness toward women
and noted that such sensitivity was particularly fitting for a man who cherished his
own daughters so deeply. Id. For a series of articles in praise ofJustice Blackmun, see
generally A Tribute to JusticeHarryA. Blackmun: "The Kind Voice ofFriends,"43 AM. U. L.
REV. 687 (1994) (bidding farewell to the retiring Justice with a collection of letters
from esteemed colleagues and friends).
86 See Westcott, 443 U.S. at 89, 93.
87 See UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 190 (1991).
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private employer was the responsible party."' In UAW v. Johnson
Controls,Inc., 9 Justice Blackmun questioned the constitutionality of
an employer's sex-based classification that excluded women from
certain jobs because of women's childbearing potential.9 TheJustice, writing for the Court, struck down the policy as violative of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.91
Petitioners, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), filed a class action suit
against Johnson Controls (Johnson).92 Johnson was a battery manufacturer whose business involved contact with lead, exposure to
which poses serious health risks. 93 In 1982, Johnson revised its employment policy to exclude women from lead-exposure jobs.94 Specifically, Johnson's policy of fetal protection provided that
pregnant women or those capable of pregnancy would not be considered for positions involving lead exposure.95 Those women who
Id.
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
90 Id. at 190.
91 Id. at 211.
92 Id. at 192. Petitioners included a woman who voluntarily underwent sterilization to avert job loss, a woman whose salary was reduced when she was transferred
from a lead-exposure position, and a man who unsuccessfully requested temporary
leave to reduce his lead levels so he could become a father. Id.
93 Id. at 190. In the years prior to petitioners' suit and following the enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Johnson implemented a warning policy regarding the
employment of women in lead-exposure positions. Id. at 191 (citation & quotation
omitted). Prior to the Civil Rights Act, Johnson excluded women from all battery
manufacturing positions. Id. (citation omitted) The Act, however, invalidated this
policy. Id. at 191. Johnson then implemented a policy of warning, which was
changed to a policy of exclusion in 1982. Id.
The relevant portion of the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988)).
94 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 191. Johnson announced this decision after eight
pregnant workers in the preceding three years showed critical levels of lead in their
blood. Id. at 191-92 (citation omitted). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards indicated that a lead blood level in excess of thirty micrograms per deciliter, like those of the pregnant employees, was critically high. Id.
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1989)).
95 Id. at 192 (quotation omitted). The policy provided, in pertinent part: "'[I] t is
[Johnson Controls'] policy that women who are pregnant or who are capable of bear88
89
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could medically document their sterility were exempt from the exclusion policy.96
Petitioners filed suit in the federal district court, averring that
Johnson's gender exclusion policy violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.97 On appeal, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
Supreme Court majority, held that Johnson's gender-based policy
overtly discriminated against women by classifying them on the baing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bumping, transfer or
promotion rights.'" Id. (quotation omitted) (alteration in original).
96 Id. (quotation omitted).
97 Id.; see supra note 93 (setting forth the relevant provisions of the Act). The district court certified the class as "'all past, present, and future production and maintenance employees'" in Johnson's plants "'who have been and continue to be affected
by [the employer's] Fetal Protection Policy implemented in 1982.'" Johnson Controls,
499 U.S. at 192-93 (quotation omitted) (alteration in original). Employing the business necessity defense used in other districts, the court granted summary judgment
for Johnson. Id. at 193 (citation omitted). The court reasoned that although disagreement propounds over the exact effects of lead on the unborn, studies yield that
exposure affects the reproductive capacities of men and women and impacts fetuses
even more severely. Id. (quotation omitted). The district court further declared that
petitioners were unable to suggest an alternative to Johnson's policy that would protect potential life. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, the lower court upheld Johnson's
business necessity defense and declined to needlessly address the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) issue. Id. (quotation omitted).
Affirming the decision of the district court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
sitting en banc, upheld Johnson's business necessity defense. Id. (citation omitted).
The court of appeals reached this decision after examining the fetal protection opinions of other circuits, which outlined the business necessity defense as a three-part
inquiry. Id. at 193-94 (citations omitted). Courts applying the defense considered:
(1) whether there is a significant health hazard to the fetus; (2) whether only women
can transmit the danger to the fetus; and (3) whether a less discriminatory policy
could offer equivalent protection to the unborn. Id. at 194 (citation omitted). The
Seventh Circuit found that business necessity was the appropriate standard for evaluating Johnson's policy since it effectively balanced the interests of both employer and
employees consistent with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. (quotation omitted).
In addition, the court of appeals found no triable fact question since both parties
agreed that lead exposure posed a substantial hazard to fetuses. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the court found that evidence of fetal harm due to the father's lead
exposure, unlike the mother's, was merely speculative. Id. (quotation omitted). The
court held that petitioners' failure to propose less discriminatory alternatives operated as a waiver of the issue. Id. (citation omitted).
Lastly, the appellate court addressed the BFOQ defense. Id. at 195 (citation
omitted). The court declared that even if this defense were applicable, the industrial
safety concerns vital to Johnson's business justified the fetal protection policy. Id.
The court of appeals reasoned that more was at issue than simply a woman's individual choice to accept the hazards of employment. Id. (quotation omitted).
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Seventh Circuit's unprecedented holding that a fetal protection policy targeting only females because of their pregnancy potential can be sustained as a BFOQ. UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 494 U.S. 1055, 1055 (1990).
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sis of their capacity for pregnancy.98 Further, Justice Blackmun announced that the absence of gender-based animus did not justify
the facially discriminatory policy. 9 Moreover, the Justice concluded that the overt discrimination inherent in Johnson's policy
precluded Johnson's use of the business necessity defense and demanded application of the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) analysis, which Johnson could not satisfy. 10 0 Concluding
thatJohnson's assertion of fetal protection did not justify the exclusion of women, Justice Blackmun held that Johnson's policy was
invalid under both Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) °1O
First, Justice Blackmun addressed the bias perpetuated by
Johnson's policy of offering only fertile men and not fertile women
the choice to endanger their reproductive health to maintain employment. 0 2 Justice Blackmun emphasized thatJohnson's employment policy classified on the basis of sex."0 ' The Justice further
declared that the alleged benign motive of fetal protection could
not justify sex discrimination. 4
To support the finding of facial discrimination, Justice Blackmun invoked the PDA.10 5 Under the PDA, the justice foundJohnson's treatment of all women as "potentially pregnant" evidence of
98 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197.

99 Id. at 198.
100 Id. at 199-200, 206.
101 Id. at 211. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which added a subsection

to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provides in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes. . . as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
102 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198.
103 Id. at 199.
104 Id. Noting that Johnson's policy distinguished employees on the non-neutral
bases of sex and potential for pregnancy, the Justice proffered that Johnson's objective was not really protection of all its workers' unborn children. Id. at 198. The
Justice posited thatJohnson's disregard of evidence concerning the adverse effects of
lead on men indicated thatJohnson was interested solely in the risks to the unborn of
its women workers. Id. (citations omitted). As further evidence ofJohnson's discriminatory intent, Justice Blackmun pointed to the provision requiring only women to
prove their infertility. Id.
105 Id. at 198-99 (quotation omitted). The Justice explained that the statute expanded the Tide VII definition of de facto sex discrimination to include classification
on the basis of pregnancy or related conditions. Id. (quotation omitted).
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explicit sex discrimination.' 16 Justice Blackmun further declared
that the absence of gender-based animus could not transform an
otherwise facially discriminatory policy into a benign policy with
merely a discriminatory impact. 10 7 The Justice explained that the
express terms of the classification, not the underlying motive, determine whether an employment policy effects disproportionate
ends through facially discriminatory means. 108 The Justice clarified that overt sex-based discrimination in the workplace may be
justified only when the reason for the discrimination is a bona fide
occupational qualification. 1 9 Accordingly, because Johnson's fetal
protection policy failed to provide equal gender treatment, Justice
Blackmun condemned it as violative of Title VII, absent the establishment of a BFOQ. 110
Next, Justice Blackmun considered whether Johnson's policy
could qualify as a BFOQ exception to Title VII's non-discrimination mandate. 1" Justice Blackmun stressed that a qualification
must relate to the "essence" or "central mission" of the employer's
106 Id. at 199.
Id.

107

108 Id. (citation omitted).
109 Id. at 199-200. Justice Blackmun noted that the official policy of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) adopted this same view. Id. at 200. The
Justice further informed that the EEOC issued policy guidelines in direct response to
the court of appeals decision in the instant case. Id. (citation omitted). According to
these policies, the Justice explained, Tide VII forbids requiring a plaintiff to carry the
burden of proof in an action where there is explicit evidence of facial discrimination.
Id. (quotation omitted).
110 Id.
111 Id. at

200-01.

Section 703(e) (1) allows an employer to discriminate on the basis of "religion,
sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988).
Initially, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the BFOQ exception based on the plain language and legislative history of
§ 703. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
332-37 (1977)) (other citations omitted). To illustrate the provision's limited scope,
the Justice enumerated its restrictive terms, pointing to "occupational" as demanding
a strong nexus between classification and job performance. Id.
Justice Blackmun continued by rejecting the concurrence's notion that all employer-imposed discriminatory conditions are 'job related." Id. The Justice charged
that such an interpretation would render "occupational" mere excess baggage and
would undermine legislative intent. Id.
The Justice was unwilling to acceptJohnson's contention that its fetal protection
policy was justifiable under the safety exception to the BFOQ. Id. at 202, 204. The
Justice instructed that claims of sex discrimination for safety purposes have been rigidly scrutinized. Id. at 202. Justice Blackmun concluded that fetuses are not customers or other third parties whose safety is primary to the battery-manufacturing
business. Id, at 203. The Justice noted that "[n]o one can disregard the possibility of
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business to qualify as a BFOQ. 112 After defining the narrow parameters of the BFOQ safety exception, Justice Blackmun declined to
apply it to fetal protection policies that disproportionately penalize
women."-' Rephrasing the BFOQ standard, Justice Blackmun declared that women equally capable. of performing their jobs may
not be compelled to choose between parenting and
employment
14
when their male colleagues are not so mandated.'
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun announced thatJohnson's fetal
protection policy did not qualify under the defined BFOQ exception.115 In particular, the Justice indicated that fertile women perinjury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it transforms this
deep social concern into an essential aspect of battery making." Id. at 203-04.
112 Johnson Controls,499 U.S. at 203 (quoting Dothard,433 U.S. at 333) (other quotation omitted). Next, Justice Blackmun rebuked the concurrence for its failure to consider the "essence of the business" test. Id. The Justice posited that by focusing only
on expense and safety concerns, the concurrence attempted an unprecedented expansion of the narrow BFOQ exception. Id. TheJustice further criticized the concurrence for its effort to convert this action into a customer safety case. Id. Though
cognizant of the risk of fetal harm caused by lead exposure, Justice Blackmun cautioned that the BFOQ exception is not so expansive that it converts this profound
social concern into a vital element of battery manufacturing. Id. at 203-04.
113 Id. at 204. The Justice reasoned that elasticizing the exception to this degree
would defy the plain language of the BFOQ and contradict the legislative history and
terms of the PDA. Id. Further,Justice Blackmun instructed that the PDA amendment
to Title VII incorporates its own BFOQ standard that demands equivalent treatment
for all employees unless they differ in their ability or inability to perform. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)).
114 Id. Accordingly, Justice Blackmun refuted the concurrence's theory that the
PDA standard did not change the BFOQ exception. Id. The Justice submitted that
the concurrence could only arrive at such a conclusion by disregarding the second
clause of the PDA which requires employers to treat equally pregnant and non-pregnant workers of the same ability. Id. at 204-05 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)
(providing that "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work")). Thus, Justice
Blackmun refused to sanction the concurrence's restructuring of the PDA. See id. at
204-05.
Next, Justice Blacknun examined the legislative history of the PDA. Id. at 205.
Pointing to Senate and House Reports, the Justice explained that the PDA standard
was implemented to ensure that female workers would not receive disparate treatment or forced unemployment because of their child-bearing capacity. Id. (quotation
& citation omitted). Moreover, the Justice warned that the legislative history of the
PDA advises against expanding the BFOQ to cover fetal protection policies and accords the choice between pregnancy and employment to women. Id. at 205-06. Thus,
Justice Blackmun conduded that the BFOQ provision, PDA, legislative history, and
case precedent forbid an employer from discriminating against women on the basis of
their pregnancy potential, unless their reproductive capacity renders job performance
impossible. Id. at 206. Further, theJustice reiterated that an employer must tailor its
interests in women's safe and thorough job performance to those areas of employment that form the central mission of the business. Id.
115 Id.
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form battery manufacturing duties as well as any of their
colleagues." 6 The Justice rejected Johnson's assertion that its noble and legitimate interest in the well-being of potential life warranted a BFOQ of female infertility.' 1 7 Regard for the integrity of
the unborn, the Justice declared, could not be deemed the soul of
Johnson's business." 8 Moreover, the Justice reiterated Congress'
intent that such concerns must be addressed by the future parents,
not their employers." 9 Thus, Justice Blackmun held that Title VII
and the PDA forbid termination of women who refuse to be sterilized.' 20 The Justice further concluded that Johnson's purported
apprehension of fetal harm, regardless of how genuine, could in
12
no way justify its belief in the ineptitude of all fertile females.
Lastly, Justice Blackmun reiterated the precedented ruling
22
that Title VII prohibits gender-based fetal protection programs.1
The Justice observed that the purported interest in the safety of
children has long been the rationale for discriminating against women in the workplace. 23 Nevertheless, the Justice, like Congress,
refused to accept this excuse and emphasized that the instant decision does no more than uphold the mandate of the PDA.124 In a
closing statement, Justice Blackmun urged that the judiciary
should not define the parameters of women's maternal and income-earning roles. 1 25 The Justice reminded that Congress has acId.
Id.
118 Id. at 207.
19 Id. at 211.
120 Id. at 207. Next, Justice Blackmun dismissed Johnson's contention that the impossibility of knowing which women would get pregnant justified exclusion of all fertile women. Id. Justice Blackmun, alluding to the eight reported pregnancies,
accused Johnson of having an interest in only a handful of women. Id. To support
this accusation, the Justice cited national statistics revealing that each year only a small
percentage of women actually become pregnant. Id. (citation omitted).
121 Id. Justice Blackmun also rejected the dissent's position that a BFOQ could be
grounded in the increased costs, arising from escalating tort liability, that could result
from permitting women to work in lead-exposure positions. Id. at 208. The Justice
noted that, because Johnson Controls complied with OSHA standards for lead exposure, a finding of tort liability absent negligence would be unlikely. Id. Concluded
Justice Blackmun: "If, under general tort principles, Tide VII bans sex-specific fetalprotection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best." Id. The Justice further noted that "[w] e ... are not presented with,
nor do we decide, a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the
survival of the employer's business." Id. at 210-11.
122 Id. at 211.
123 Id. (citation omitted).
116
117

124 Id.
125

Id.

1995]

COMMENT

1203

corded that responsibility to women themselves. 126
Taken collectively, Westcott and Johnson Controls evince Justice
126 Id. In a lengthy concurrence, Justice White approved the Court's determination
thatJohnson's policy was facially discriminatory, but rejected the majority's limitation
of the BFOQ exception. Id. (White, J., concurring) Justice White first proposed that
the language of Title VII only requires Johnson's policy to be "reasonably necessary"
to the "normal operation" of its "particular business." Id. at 212 (White, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988)). The concurring Justice acknowledged the difficulty of meeting that challenge, but found unsupported the majority's
proposition that fetal protection schemes could never qualify as a BFOQ. Id. Further,
the Justice suggested that avoidance of substantial tort liability could justify a sexbased policy. Id.
In a continuing attack on the Court's analysis, Justice White challenged that the
majority erred in stating that the increased cost of employing women is an invalid
defense to Title VII mandates. Id. at 214-15 (White, J., concurring). Justice White
proffered that previous interpretations of the BFOQ defense yield that the provision
is extensive enough to encompass the cost and safety concerns behind fetal protection plans. Id. at 215 (White,J., concurring). Moreover, the concurringJustice found
useless and irrelevant the majority's limitation of the BFOQ exception to situations in
which gender or pregnancy impedes job performance. Id. at 217. (White, J., concurring) (quoting id. at 204). Ultimately, Justice White posited that the BFOQ exception
reflects the legislature's refusal to compel employers to alter the essence of their businesses. Id. at 218 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Next, Justice White chided the Court for its determination that the PDA narrows
the boundaries of the BFOQ defense. Id. (citing id. at 204). Instead, theJustice proffered that the PDA merely notified that pregnancy and related conditions fall within
the scope of Title VII. Id. The Justice denied that the PDA changed the guidelines
for employer defenses. Id. at 219 (White, J., concurring) (quotation omitted). Ultimately, Justice White concluded that neither legislative intent, case law, nor the statute's plain language supported the Court's myopic interpretation of the BFOQ
defense. Id. at 219 & n.8.
Justice White recognized that the newness of the fetal protection issue necessitates its case-by-case review at trial. Id. at 222 (quotation omitted). Cursory disposal
through summary judgment, acknowledged the Justice, invites less wary employers to
implement fetal protection policies that achieve minimal safety at the expense of
countless women. Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, because the case was too quickly
disposed, the concurrence would have reversed the Court of Appeals grant of summary judgment. Id.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, substantially agreed with the majority's analysis, but objected to certain lines of reasoning. Id. at 223 (Scalia, J., concurring). To begin Justice Scalia found the evidence concerning men and lead exposure
to be irrelevant. Id. (quoting id. at 198). The Justice reminded that even in the absence of such evidence, disparate treatment of women and men for reproductive reasons is wholly impermissible. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988)). NextJustice
Scalia emphasized that because of the PDA, all fertile women have the option to risk
fetal health for employment. Id.
Lastly, Justice Scalia rebuked the majority for its announcement that the increased expense of employing females could not justify a BFOQ defense. Id. at 223,
224 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, agreeing with Justice White, noted that
precedent does not support this conclusion. Id. at 224 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus,
although Justice Scalia found excess cost a valid BFOQ, the Justice agreed that Johnson did not meet the standard. Id. Accordingly, Justice Scalia joined the majority in
reversing the court of appeals's grant of summary judgment. Id.
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Blackmun's clear recognition of women's essential role and rights
in the workplace. 127 Although more than a decade passed between
the two decisions, and nearly two between Roe and Johnson Controls,
the battle for women's emancipation waged on. 1 28 By 1979, women as a group had left the home and secured a position in the
employment arena. 2 9 In Westcott, Blackmun granted women a victory over government-perpetuated stereotypes of women's economic inferiority. 3 ' Blackmun's recognition that females are
significant wage earners, and not uniquely mothers and wives, was
a logical outgrowth of Roe.' 3 1 While Roe recognized women's selfgovernance, Westcott reaffirmed that recognition by acknowledging
32
the fruits of such independence.1
Yet, despite Blackmun's command that government accord
women and men equal recognition for a job well done, women's
battle in the workplace was just getting started.' 3 3 Thirteen years
after Westcott, discrimination in the workplace was still a reality."s
As Justice Blackmun observed in Johnson Controls, women had not
yet won acceptance in the work force.'3 5 Johnson's pretextual fetal
127 See David L. Kirp, Fetal Hazards, GenderJustice,and the Justices: The Limits of Equality, 34 Wm. & MAr L. REv. 101, 102 (1992) (quotation omitted) (proclaiming Johnson
Controlsa "'victory for women and for safety in the workplace [which] makes it dear
that women have the right to make critical work and family decisions for themselves
and for their children'") (alteration in original).
128 See Defeis, supranote 1, at 363. Professor Defeis noted that despite the progressive position taken by the United States at the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights, the evolution of women's legal status in America and globally is painfully slow.
Id.
129 See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 H.Rv. L. REv. 1497, 1498 (1983) (noting that despite the successes of women in the battle for equality, subordination to men is still a reality attributable to the
flawed assumptions in which the ideology of social reform is grounded).
130 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206 (asserting that fertile women are generally
capable of performing their job duties as well as their male counterparts).
131 See Christine Neylon O'Brien & Margo E. K. Reder, Modeling an Employment Policy to Unify Workers'Rights with FetalProtection, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1149, 1150 (1992) (citations omitted). The authors noted that medical advances in fetal care and birth
control accompanied the growing feminist movement that urged women to shed the
traditional garb of domestic servility and economic inferiority. Id. (citations omitted).
132 See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 84, 85 (1979).
133 See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HtARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1-5
(1990) (offering a First Amendment perspective on the shocking, vulgar, and degrading innuendos and ridicule that women endure in the workplace).
134 SeeJennifer Morton, Comment, Pregnancy in the Workplace-Sex-Specific Fetal Protection Policies-UAWv.Johnson Controls, Inc.-A Victory for Women?, 59 TENN. L. REv.
617, 624 (1992). Morton noted that fetal protection policies not only.violate women's
rights but also effectively exclude women from desirable, high paying positions. Id. at
618.
135 See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 211 (citation omitted) ("Concern for a woman's
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protection policy attested to the fact that women were primarily
identified as mothers.l" By invalidating Johnson's scheme and rejecting the claim that women's child-bearing potential renders
them incapable on the job, the Justice once again damned the iis13 7
torical misconceptions that have stigmatized women.
While women's unique child-bearing capacity should not be
denied, it should not be their hallmark."s Nor should it be a
brand of ineptitude.139 With Westcott and Johnson Controls,Justice
Blackmun demanded government and private recognition of women's self-governing capacity.1 "° Westcott and Johnson Controls reaffirmed the promise of Roe and fertilized the seeds of genderjustice
by freeing women to reap the benefits of their abilities.'
IV.

ACCORDING

FuLL PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN THE Cvic ARENA:
THE FINAL DECISION

In his final Supreme Court opinion, Justice Blacknun paid

crowning homage to the nobility of women in public life.

42

With

existing or potential offspring historically has been the excuse for denying women
equal employment opportunities.").
136 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IoWA L. REv. 95, 96 (1993)
(footnotes omitted) ("Motherhood, like sexuality, plays a critical role in women's subordination.... A woman's status as a childbearer determines her identity.").
137 See O'Brien & Reder, supra note 131, at 1149-50 (averring that gender-specific
fetal protection schemes reflect employers' continuing perception of women as fungible and insignificant contributors who cannot make sound reproductive choices).
138 See Morton, supranote 134, at 620-21 (citation omitted) (noting that commentators have criticized gender-specific employment schemes for failing to acknowledge
women's procreative self-governance).
139 See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-86, 288-89,
290 (1987) (citations omitted). Justice Blackmun joined the majority in upholding a
California law that singled out pregnant women for special treatment in alleged violation of the PDA. Id. at 278, 292. The Court upheld the law, despite its special treatment of women, because the law was enacted to assist, not deprive, pregnant women.
Id. at 285-86, 288-89, 290.
140 See Sandra Day O'Connor, Portia's Pvogress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1546, 1549-1553
(1991) (celebrating women's historic and ongoing struggle for public and private recognition in the legal profession); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Progression of Women in the Law, 28 VAL. U. L. Rxv. 1161, 1162 (1994) ("[F]or many of our people, an
individual's sex is no longer remarkable, or even unusual, with regard to his or her
qualifications to serve on the Supreme Court.").
141 See Kirp, supra note 127, at 102 (quotation omitted) (recognizing Johnson Controls as a coup for women in the workplace). But see Morton, supra note 134, at 619
(arguing that Johnson Controls was only a limited victory for women because the decision demonstrated the inadequacy of choices available to working women).
142 SeeJoanna L. Grossman, Note, Women's Juiy Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege
of Difference?, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1115, 1160 (1994) (arguing that the Court's recognition of the irreparable harm inhicted by gender-based jury exclusion is crucial to
women's struggle for equal rights).
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JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 14 3 Justice Blackmun reiterated the

right of women to participate in jury service and, in so doing, reavowed the celebrated individuality and autonomy of women first
proclaimed in Roe.'
InJ.E.B., the state of Alabama filed suit in the District Court of

Jackson County on behalf of the mother of a minor. 145 The petitioner, J.E.B., was named as the defendant in the state's suit to establish paternity and seek child support. 46 Jury selection
commenced on October 21, 1991 at which time the assembled
panel of potential jurors consisted of twelve men and twenty-four

women. 147 After the elimination of three jurors for cause, ten
members of the remaining panel were men.14 The state then exercised all but one of its peremptory challenges 49 to eliminate
male jurors, and petitioner acted likewise to remove female jurors.15 The resultant jury consisted entirely of female jurors. 5 '
The petitioner disputed Alabama's peremptory challenges, al-

leging that the state's exercise of strikes solely against men on the
basis of gender violated the Equal Protection Clause. 5 2 Petitioner
charged that the holding of Batson v. Kentucky,' forbidding racebased peremptory challenges, extended to prohibit gender-based

strikes.' 5 4 Rejecting this assertion, the district court proceeded to
trial with the all-female jury.' 5 5 A verdict was returned in favor of
the state, and the court accordingly ordered petitioner to provide
child support.' 5 6
143

114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).

'44

See Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105

HARv. L. REv. 1920, 1928-29 (1992) (recognizing women's right to jury service as the

right to participate in the democratic process that is inextricably linked to the right of
suffrage).
145 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1421.
146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Id. at 1421-22.

A peremptory challenge encompasses "[tihe right to challenge a juror without
assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the challenge." BLAcK's LAw Dic149

150

1136 (6th ed. 1990).
J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.

15'

Id.

TIONARY

Id.
476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Batson Court held that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits states to strike a prospective juror on the basis of the juror's race. Id. at 97.
154 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
155 Id. (citation omitted).
156 Id. In a post-judgment motion, petitioner raised the Batson argument for a second time, and the court again declined to extend its ruling to prohibit gender-based
strikes. Id. (citation omitted). On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, and the Alabama Supreme Court subse152
155
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the issue of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
prohibits gender-based peremptory strikes. 15 7 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun announced that intentional state-imposed
gender discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause and
propagates malicious and antiquated misconceptions about the capabilities of the sexes.' 58
At the outset, Justice Blackmun noted the relative newness of
invidious gender discrimination in peremptory strikes.1 59
quenly denied review. Id. (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. J.E.B. v. T.B., 113 S. Ct. 2330, 2330 (1993).
157 JE.B., 113 S. Ct. at 2330.
158 J.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1422.
159 Id. The Justice reminded that the exclusion of women from juries well into the
twentieth century precluded the use of sex-based challenges. Id.
Justice Blackmun examined at length the exclusion of women from the civic
arena. See id. at 1423-24. The Justice noted the depth to which this prejudice pervaded American thought, remarking that even after blacks were granted seats on juries, women were still excluded. Id. at 1423 (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 28990 (1947)) (other citation omitted). Justice Blackmun further instructed that women
had still not gained widespread admittance to juries despite winning the suffrage
right. Id. at 1423 & n.3 (citations omitted). The Justice noted that the minority of
states that gradually did allow women jurors created numerous deterrents to discourage their participation. Id. at 1423 (citing Fay, 332 U.S. at 289) (other citation
omitted).
Justice Blackmun traced the exclusion of women from juries back to English
common law, which justified the practice by "'the doctrine of propter defectum sexus,
literally, the "defect of sex."'" Id. (quotations omitted). The Justice further explained
that early American opponents of female inclusion on juries disguised their objections in the valiant desire to shelter delicate and innocent females from the evil courtroom. Id. (citing Bailey v. State, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949) ("Criminal court
trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind, and they sometimes require consideration of indecent conduct, the use of filthy and loathsome words, references to
intimate sex relationships, and other elements that would prove humiliating, embarrassing, and degrading to a lady.")) (other citations omitted).
It was not until the mid-twentieth century, informed the Justice, that the
Supreme Court first challenged the fairness of excluding women from juries. Id. at
1424 (citing Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1946)). Justice Blackmun
explained that inclusion opponents challenged that women would contribute nothing
to a trial and, thus, their exclusion did not render an all-male jury unfair for a defendant. Id. Despite charges of women's worthlessness, the Justice noted that the Ballard
court required inclusion of women on federal juries in those jurisdictions where women were permitted to participate in state proceedings. Id. Justice Blackmun highlighted Ballards reasoning, noting in particular the Court's emphasis that female
jurors act no more as a class than their male counterparts. Id. (quoting Ballard, 329
U.S. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted)). The Justice further underscored the Court's observation that neither women nor men are disposable, and that the presence of both
genders on ajury is essential to creation of a distinct character. Id. (quoting Ballard,
329 U.S. at 193-94 (footnotes omitted)).
Despite the Court's recognition of women's worth in the civic arena, Justice

Blackmun noted the Court's refusal to grant women an unqualified right to equal jury
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The Justice noted that the Supreme Court has reviewed genderbased classifications with heightened scrutiny since 1971 to ensure
that the government's purportedly benign distinctions were not

products of archaic stereotypes.

60

Next, Justice Blackmun rejected Alabama's contention that
sex discrimination in jury selection should be permitted because
16
gender bias has not been as pervasive as race discrimination. 1
The Justice recognized that women and blacks have not suffered
from identical social biases, but suggested that the common factor
of victimization overcomes the disparities. 1 62 Furthermore, the Justice challenged the Court to recognize that our country's trail of
gender discrimination commands the heightened scrutiny afforded sex-based classifications. 6 Accordingly, the Justice reminded that for gender classifications to survive constitutional
muster, they must have an exceedingly persuasive justification
which furthers a legitimate government objective.TM
Applying this standard to the instant case, Justice Blackmun
considered whether peremptory challenges rooted in sex stereotypes significantly further an individual's interest in selecting an
impartial jury. 165 The Justice first addressed Alabama's contention
that its use of the peremptory challenge to eliminate male jurors
was justified by the notion that men are likely to sympathize with
one another in a paternity suit, while women are prone to feel for
the mother. 6 6 Justice Blackmun vehemently denounced this theaccess at the state level. Id. In particular, the Justice cited the Court's reasoning that
despite the expanding freedoms of women, statutory exemption of women from compulsory jury service was reasonable because women occupied a unique place at the
core of the family. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun noted, however, that
fourteen years later the Court recanted its earlier reasoning and used the Sixth
Amendment to strike a similar statutory exemption. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975)). Blackmun pointed to the Court's analysis that exclusion of certain factions of society from juries undermines the Constitution by denying
diversity and sharing of civic duty. Id. (quoting Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530-31) (other
citation omitted).
160 Id. at 1424-25 (citations omitted).
161 Id. at 1425 (citation omitted).
162 Id. (quoting Note, supra note 144, at 1921).
163 Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)).
164 Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982);
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1979)).
165 Id. at 1426. Justice Blackmun also briefly entertained Alabama's contention that
a state's interest in determining the paternity of a child justifies gender-based peremptory strikes. Id. at 1426 n.8. The Justice summarily discarded this theory, rebuking Alabama for its failure to recognize that the sole interest behind the peremptory
challenge is in obtaining an impartial jury. Id.
166 Id. at 1426 (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun challenged Alabama's reliance
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ory, warning that sex-based peremptory strikes cannot be justified
by the very same biases the law forbids. 167 The Justice accused Alabama of resurrecting the reprehensible notions that once rationalized women's exclusion from juries and voting booths. 6 8 Justice
Blacknun reiterated that the Equal Protection Clause demands
that the government probe deeper than superficial stereotypes
when making decisions that are apt to memorialize prejudice. 6 9
Moreover, Justice Blackmun warned that assuming that jurors
have certain attitudes based on their sex is tantamount to legally
branding them inferior.17 0 For women in particular, the Justice
posited, the assumption of attitudes exhumes a whole history of
on one study to establish that the two genders have notably different attitudes that
warrant gender-bias in peremptory challenges. Id. at 1426 n.9 (citation omitted).
The Justice pointed to another source which indicated that there are no cognizable
differences in the reactions of the sexes to trials. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover,
Justice Blackmun charged that even before women were awarded a constitutional
right to jury participation, academics cautioned against using gender as a proxy for
bias. Id. (citation omitted).
167 Id. at 1426 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).
168 Id. at 1426 & n.10. Justice Blackmun noted that such invidious discrimination
surfaced even in trial manuals. Id. at 1426 n.10 (quoting Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptoy Challenges, and the Review ofJuy Verdicts,
56 U. CHI. L. Rav. 153, 210 (1989) (quotation omitted) ("'I don't like women jurors
.... It is possible that their "women's intuition" can help you if you can't win your
case with the facts.'")). Moreover, the Justice chided Alabama's failure to substantiate
its assertion that sex alone is determinative of ajuror's attitude. Id. at 1426-27. Invoking precedent, the Justice instructed that even if some ounce of truth could be detected in the stereotypes, that fact alone could not justify sex-biased jury selection. Id.
at 1427 n.11.
169 Id. (citations omitted). Addressing the effects of jury selection bias, Justice
Blackmun first emphasized that all parties to the action face the risk that the same
discrimination that infected the selection process will likewise contaminate the entire
litigation. Id. at 1427 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628
(1991)). Second, the Justice proffered that society suffers a loss of faith in the judicial
process due to the state-endorsed prejudice in the courtroom. Id. The Justice cautioned that the government's use of sex stereotypes in jury selection perpetuates biases that have long infected various aspects of public life. Id. (quotation omitted).
Third, the Justice posited that intentional gender discrimination incites doubt regarding ajury's objectivity and respect for the law, most palpably in cases in which gendersensitive issues are paramount. Id.
After enumerating the harms wrought by prejudicial jury selection, Justice Blackmun addressed Alabama's contention that men are not protected against gender bias.
Id. at 1427-28 (citations omitted). The Justice rejected as contrary to precedent Alabama's theory that men have no right to protection against bias because they have not
historically been its victims. Id. (citation omitted). Noting that jurors have a right to
unbiased selection methods, the Justice reminded that this right applies to men and
women alike. Id. (citing Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723
(1982)).
170 Id. (citation omitted).
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exclusion from the civic arena. 1 71 Furthermore, the Justice declared, gender exclusion invites the repugnant belief that certain
people, because of their sex alone, are unfit in the eyes of the government to decide important issues. 172
Lastly, Justice Blackmun avowed that the equal chance to
share in the administration of justice is implicit in our democratic
society. 173 This opportunity, the Justice emphasized, advances the
equal protection guarantee of participatory rights for all races, all
nationalities, and both genders. 17 Conversely, the Justice warned
that deprivation of these participatory rights on the basis of gender, like race, imperils equal protection principles as well as the
171 Id. Justice Blackmun challenged the oft sounded claim that all peremptory
strikes are rooted in some bias. Id. at 1428 n.14. The Justice explained that where
peremptory strikes are grounded in characteristic classifications other than sex or
race, they do not perpetuate the same notions about the group's abilities or tendencies that have historically excluded them from various social functions. Id. (citation
omitted).
172 Id. at 1428. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that the Court has historically ratified discrimination in peremptory strikes. Id. at 1429 n. 15. The Justice refused, however, to accept past error as a justification for perpetuating invidious bias. Id.
Next, Justice Blackmun urged that the proscription of gender bias does not portend the end of peremptory challenges. Id. at 1429. Nor, the Justice declared, do
gender-neutral strikes conflict with the government's goal of securing a fair trial. Id.
Justice Blackmun assured that litigants may still eliminate unacceptable jurors so long
as gender is not used as a metaphor for prejudice. Id. Accordingly, the Justice declared that peremptory strikes based on traits that disproportionately characterize one
gender may be upheld absent proof of discriminatory motive. Id. at 1429 & n.16
(citation omitted).
Justice Blackmun next addressed the claim that a rule forbidding gender-based
challenges is unworkable. Id. at 1429. This argument, the Justice rebutted, is undercut by the successful implementation of sex-neutral strikes in many jurisdictions. Id.
(citation omitted). TheJustice further instructed that the party charging sex discrimination must make a prima facie case of intentional bias before any explanation by the
striking party is required. Id. at 1429-30 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97
(1986)). Even then, the Justice clarified, the explanation need not satisfy "for cause"
standards, but must be without gender bias or pretext. Id. at 1430 (citation omitted).
Moreover, the Justice observed that race and gender are overlapping concepts. Id.
Accordingly, Justice Blackmun charged that failure to protect jurors against either
form of discrimination may undermine Batson. Id. The correlation between race and
gender, the Justice posited, makes gender an easy pretext and shield for racial bias.
Id.
173 Id. The Justice recognized that our long tradition of trial by jury is founded on
the concept of an impartial jury taken from all levels of society. Id. at 1430 n.19
(quoting Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)). The Justice acknowledged that this system does not demand the presence on all juries of persons from all
groups and classes. Id. (quoting Thie4 328 U.S. at 220). Nonetheless, the Justice insisted that of the potential jurors, otherwise eligible individuals must not be intentionally excluded based on their economic, religious, or racial classifications. Id. (quoting
Thie4 328 U.S. at 220).
174 Id. at 1430 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991)).
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integrity of the courts. 175 Accordingly, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Equal Protection Clause forbids gender discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 176 To hold
otherwise, the Justice posited, would reduce the Equal Protection
1
Clause to mere rhetoric.

77

175 Id.
176

Id.

177 Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 (1986)).

In a cautionary concurrence, Justice O'Connor approved of the Court's ban on
sex-based peremptory strikes, but warned that its victory over gender bias does not
come without cost. Id. at 1430, 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice first
acknowledged that the majority's holding was a logical extension of Batson with possibly even greater ramifications. Id. at 1431 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Specifically,
Justice O'Connor posited that by requiring stricter adherence to constitutional tenets
in jury selection, the majority has invited litigants to bring to the forefront what was
once in the periphery. Id.
Continuing in this vein, Justice O'Connor cautioned that the Court's holding
sounds the death toll for peremptory strikes. Id. Justice O'Connor recalled the long
history of the peremptory challenge as well as its importance in securing a fair trial.
Id. (quotation & citations omitted). The Justice lamented that as the Court pulls
tighter on the constitutional reins, attorneys will be forced to verbalize intuitive
hunches which the peremptory strike once precluded. Id. Justice O'Connor opined
that the majority's ban converts the peremptory challenge into a challenge for cause.
Id. Moreover, the Justice submitted that the newly-imposed restraint on jury selection
increases the risk that prejudiced individuals will secure seats on juries because lawyers will fail or fear to articulate a gender-neutral basis for a strike. Id. Justice
O'Connor hesitated to think of the peremptory's dimming existence. Id.
Next, Justice O'Connor proffered that even when gender concepts affect the exercise of a peremptory strike, the value of the process to litigants does not wane. Id. at
1431-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice asserted that gender considerations
undoubtedly play a role in a trial. Id. at 1432 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Specifically, the Justice postulated that one need not be a sexist to recognize that in some
instances an individual's sex influences his or her perception of a case. Id. Justice
O'Connor urged that people cannot be expected, as jurors, to disregard what they
know as males or females. Id.
Justice O'Connor next denounced the Court's ban on gender-based strikes as a
limitation on a party's freedom to act on his or her own intuition. Id. The Justice
drew a distinction between stating that "gender makes no difference as a matter of law
...

[and] ... gender makes no difference as a matter of fact." Id. Further, the Justice

commended the Court's extension of Batson to gender but warned of the costs of the
decision. Id. Specifically, Justice O'Connor imparted that the gender extension adds
an additional burden to trials, foreshadows imminent doom for the peremptory challenge, and eliminates attorney intuition in jury selection. Id.
Based on these concerns, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the Court's holding
must apply only to state actors. Id. The Justice cautioned against an overbroad application of the new doctrine to private litigants, especially criminal defendants. Id. at
1432-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The Justice acknowledged
that the instant case involved no injustice to private litigants, Justice O'Connor inquired uncertainly about future actions. Id. at 1433 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy, in a brief concurrence, voiced wholesale accord with the majority. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). The Justice examined the history of Fourteenth
Amendment case law leading to the Court's conclusion. Id. Beginning with the
Amendment's origin in remedying the ills of slavery, Justice Kennedy traced the devel-
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opment and interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause to present day. Id. The
Justice remarked that it was not until 1971 that classifications based on gender received heightened scrutiny. Id. Today, noted the Justice, gender classifications are
presumably invalid. Id. (citation omitted).
In the light of this history, Justice Kennedy found the Court's application of the
Equal Protection Clause to sex-based challenges unquestionably appropriate. Id. (citations omitted). The Justice stressed that the language of the Clause clearly reflects a
concern for the rights of individuals, not groups. Id. at 1434 (Kennedy, J., concurring). At the center of the Clause's guarantees, the Justice reminded, lies the imperative that states treat people as individuals and not as indistinct members of a race or
sex. Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, Justice Kennedy submitted that when sexbased peremptory strikes are used, the affected individual suffers an affront to personal dignity and rights. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy proffered that the
ultimate proof of the Fourteenth Amendment's neutrality is found in the Court's application of its principles to bias against men. Id.
Next, stressing the importance of individual rights, Justice Kennedy speculated
about the intended effect of the Court's decision. Id. First, the Justice stressed that a
properly selected juror must not yield to individual prejudices. Id. Second, the Justice stressed that each juror is his or her own representative, not that of a class. Id.
Justice Kennedy urged that nothing would so undermine the sanctity of the judicial
system as the belief that individuals of various classes sound their biases in the jury
room. Id. (citation omitted). The Justice reminded that the jury is a cross-section of
society and as such is a tool for eliminating prejudice, not fostering it. Id. (citations
omitted). What the Constitution promises, the Justice imparted, is an impartial jury,
not twelve members of a specific sex or race. Id. (citations omitted).
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a sober dissent. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The ChiefJustice first rebuked the majority for its extension of Batson to gender-based
peremptory strikes. Id. at 1434-35 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Acknowledging that
Batson was rightly decided, the Chief Justice charged that Batson was inapplicable to
sex discrimination injury selection due to the dissimilarities between race and gender
prejudice. Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist further explained that equal protection precedent recognized the race-gender disparity in its assignment of different degrees of
protection to both. Id. at 1435 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Moreover, the Chief Justice observed that while gender and racial equality both remain
unachieved, realization of the latter presents the more formidable challenge. Id. (citation omitted).
Next, ChiefJustice Rehnquist distinguished Batson from the instant case. Id. The
ChiefJustice particularly emphasized that Batson reflects that racial concerns are the
soul of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Thus, ChiefJustice Rehnquist proffered that
Batson is inapplicable to areas other than race. Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly,
the Chief Justice concluded that when gender, not race, is at issue in jury selection,
equal protection principles weigh in favor of the peremptory challenge. Id. Applying
this to the instant case, Chief Justice Rehnquist determined that Alabama had established that sex-based peremptory strikes significantly advance the state's interest in
fair trials. Id. (citations omitted). Further, the Chief Justice declared that biological
reality, not stereotyping, gives rise to sex-based peremptory strikes. Id. The Chief
Justice thus reasoned that gender-based challenges do not breed the hate and malice
that race-based strikes incite. Id.
Lastly, ChiefJustice Rehnquist recognized the ramifications of the majority's decision envisioned by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 1435-36 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Finding the majority's extension of Batson constitutionally unwarranted and needlessly costly, the Chief Justice rejected the Court's decision. Id.
Justice Scalia, in a stinging dissent, accused the majority of a gross display of selfrighteousness. Id. at 1436 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice first denounced the
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Court's opinion as wholly tangential to the actual dispute. Id. Justice Scalia lambasted the majority for indulging in a needless dissertation on the historical plight of
women. Id.
Next, Justice Scalia chided the majority for its apparent inconsistency. Id. Specifically the Justice cited the Court's emphasis on the lack of statistical proof that sex is a
predictor ofjuror behavior. Id. The Justice contrasted this with the Court's statistical
determination nineteen years earlier that women bring distinct attitudes to the jury
room. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 n.12 (1975)). Although cognizant that times have changed and "unisex" is now vogue, the Justice attributed little
value to the statistics cherished by the Court. Id. Justice Scalia believed trained litigators are a better guide to juror perceptions. Id. Nonetheless, the Justice recognized that attorney intuition is rendered irrelevant by the majority's assertion that
there are no differences between the sexes. Id. Moreover, the Justice charged that
even if it were solidly proven that sex could predictjuror behavior, the majority would
find some rationale for declaring it an unconstitutional proxy in jury selection. Id.
(citing id. at 1427 n.11; id. at 1431-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Justice Scalia next condemned the majority's determination that all peremptory
challenges based on class characteristics violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at
1437 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Justice criticized this conclusion as unrealistic. Id.
First, Justice Scalia questioned how any group could be denied equal protection when
all groups at some point are the object of peremptory strikes. Id. (citations omitted).
The Justice reminded that the peremptory challenge and the Equal Protection Clause
have functioned rather harmoniously for more than a century. Id. Further, Justice
Scalia found untenable the majority's claim of sex discrimination against men. Id.
The Justice emphasized that for every male juror eliminated by Alabama, petitioner
struck a female. Id. Justice Scalia thus found no discriminatory impact and no gender animus. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, the Justice clarified that females are
now stricken from juries based on a suspicion of their partiality to the non-striking
party, not on a doubt as to their competence. Id. (citation omitted).
Next, Justice Scalia accused the Court of clouding its analysis with anti-sexist
blithering that served only to wreak havoc. Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
Justice opined that the majority's amorphous reasoning worked to place all peremptories in jeopardy. Id. Initially, Justice Scalia pointed to the majority's rejection of Alabama's claim that sex-based strikes advance the state's interest in an impartialjury. Id.
The Justice charged that this move ultimately spells doom for the peremptory challenge because it implies that all strikes based on group traits will be labeled stereotypes. Id. Unable to imagine which stereotypes would be deemed impermissible in
the future, Justice Scalia surrendered this determination to the Court's "peremptory/
stereotyping jurisprudence." Id.
Second, Justice Scalia added loss of the peremptory's unique character to the list
of harms wrought by the majority. Id. The Justice opined that restricting the peremptory strike's arbitrariness robs the practice of its essential freedom. Id. (quotation &
citations omitted). Moreover, the Justice warned that the peremptory challenge is
irreplaceable. Id.
A third cost of the majority's decision, the Justice opined, is the heavy burden
that the entire justice system will be forced to carry in the search for "reasoned peremptories." Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Specifically, the Justice proposed that
extended voir dire and increased litigation will resulted in great attendant costs. Id. at
1438, 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Lastly, Justice Scalia submitted that the majority's irrational holding invites
equally illogical propositions. Id. at 1439 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In particular, the
Justice noted that pursuant to the majority's new standard for peremptories, a prosecutor in future proceedings will violate the Constitution whenever he selects a witness
based on that person's likely appeal to the jury. Id.
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Justice Blackmun's JE.B. decision marks another great victory
in the battle for women's emancipation.1 78 While significant in
terms of the peremptory challenge, JE.B. is equally powerful in its
impact on women's rights. 1 79 With regard to women's advancement, Justice Blackmun reaffirmed the individuality of women by
condemning the ignorant misconception that all females perform,
By according women and men equal
react, and think similarly.'
granted women an unfettered
Justice
access to the civic arena, the
right to share in the fruits and freedoms of our democratic

society. 8 '
AsJustice Blackmun so perceptively observed inJE.B., the reprehensible exclusion of women from various sectors of public life,
specifically jury service, has been rationalized by a number of feeble explanations.18 2 Those entities responsible for perpetuating
the bias behind these excuses have sought to cast the blame for
83
their actions on God, nature, and even women themselves.1
Thanks to Justice Blackmun, this finger-pointing will cease to be
effective.' 84 No longer will the fear and hate that drive gender
prejudice escape judicial scrutiny.1 1 5 By forcing litigators to articulate legitimate reasons for excluding jurors, Justice Blackmun deConcluding that the majority cared more about paying self-serving homage to
sexual equality than upholding Fourteenth Amendment principles,Justice Scalia condemned the Court's blow to the long-standing practice of peremptory challenges. Id.
Our constitutional jurisprudence, urged the Justice, neither mandates nor sanctions
the desecration wrought by the Court. Id.
178 See George F. Will, Jury by Tria4 WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1994, at A27 (criticizing
J.E.B., but recognizing it as "a famous victory for women, the Constitution and
justice").
179 See Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court, 6-3 Prohibits Sex Bias in Jury Selection, WASH.
POST, Apr. 20, 1994, at Al (noting that Blackmun's JE.B. opinion was brimming with
concern about prejudice against women but proposing that the decision may be a
"legal lightning rod").
180 Seej.E.B., 114 S. Ct. at 1427 ("The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes ... ."). See generaUy Kenneth
L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (1984) (exploring the role of constitutional law in defining women's place in contemporary society and proposing that
women as a class perceive and approach issues differently from men).
181 See Note, supra note 144, at 1927 (citation omitted) (recognizing jury service as
both a privilege and an obligation of citizenship and an individual's greatest opportunity to partake in the administration of justice).
182 See supra note 159 (noting the various excuses for excluding women from public
life).
183 See supra note 58 (exploring the subservient role historically accorded women).
184 See Note, supra note 144, at 1926-27 (citations omitted) (enumerating the various justifications used to exclude women from juries, most notably the belief that
women belonged at home while men monopolized public life).
185 See id. at 1921 (recognizing the similarities in the prejudice that has victimized
both blacks and women).
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manded compliance with the essence of equal protectionequality. 186
Those individuals who continue to operate under the misconception of handicapping sex stereotypes have fabricated numerous
assertions why gender-bias is permissible, even valuable.""7 Apparently, the proponents of these flawed notions have forgotten that
equal protection is not a strict liability concept subject to a riskutility analysis. 188 Whether the peremptory challenge will be rendered extinct or lose its unique character is wholly irrelevant. Absent a legitimate government interest, gender bias remains
intolerable. 89 As Justice Blackmun declared, securing a fair trial is
not a valid justification for state-sponsored sex bias.1 90
V.

CONCLUSION

All too often in the enduring battle for respect and recognition, women have inculpated men for women's servile and constricted role in society.' 91 While casting blame is an unfortunate
antic in this struggle, women themselves are not free of fault, nor
are men necessarily the opponent. 192 Social phenomena, of which
both men and women are a part, have sculpted gender destinies. 9
186 SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994) (holding that
peremptory strikes based solely on the gender of a potential juror violate the Equal
Protection Clause). But see Will, supranote 178, at A27 (criticizing J.E.B. as "flimsy...
foolish .... [and] indignant about injustices to women").
187 See Note, supra note 144, at 1926-27 (citations omitted) (enumerating the various rationales for gender-biased exclusion).
188 See Peter A. Guadioso, Comment, Batson's Incomplete Legacy: Gender Discrimination and the Peremptory Challenge, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 475, 517 (1993) (quotation
& citation omitted) ("Assuming peremptory challenges are vital to the process of formulating impartial juries, the Court's 'middle tier' Equal Protection analysis mandates that 'classifications by gender must serve important government interest and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."' )
189 See Note, supra note 144, at 1933 (proffering that the sharp disagreement over
the impact of sex on juror attitude demonstrates that gender-based peremptory challenges cannot survive equal protection review).
190 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429 (1994).
191 See, e.g., Kathryn Boockvar, Beyond Survival: The ProcreativeRights of Women with
HIV, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 1 (1994) ("Increasingly, women's autonomy over
their bodies is being threatened as courts and legislatures play paternalistic roles.").
192 See generally Suzannah Bex Wilson, Note, Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the
Legal Profession: The Key to Widespread Social Reform, 67 IND. L.J. 817 (1992). This article
examines the origin and effects of sex discrimination and the social phenomena that
fuel it, and suggests methods for eliminating it. Id. at 818. The author calls for full
reform of gender discrimination in the public sphere, beginning with the legal profession. Id. at 840.42.
193 See Martha Minow, Rights of One's Own, 98 HARv.L. RFv. 1084, 1084 (1985) (reviewing ELISABETH GRIFrH, IN HER OwN RiHT: THE LIFE OF ELIZABETH CADY STAN-

TON (1984)) (praising Griffith's biography, which depicts Stanton as a champion of
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For whatever reason, many women have accepted the position that
society has assigned to them."9 Until all women confront the foe
of gender prejudice, gender justice will remain out of reach.' 9 5
The challenge comes in balancing respect for women's autonomy
with an appreciation of the fundamental differences between the
sexes. For those women who wage onward, they have found a
96
friend in Justice Harry A. Blackmun.1
Justice Blackmun's retirement following a twenty-four year
tenure on the Supreme Court marks a significant point in the
evolution of women's emancipation. 1 97 From Roe's articulation of a
revolutionary Due Process principle through J.E.B.'s similar extension of Equal Protection theory, Justice Blackmun has contributed
an invaluable quarter-century of liberating jurisprudence to women's developing autonomy. 19 8
Justice Blackmun has been a valiant leader in women's collecwomen's rights deeply affected by the "emptiness and confinement of the role that
society assigned to women in the nineteenth century").
194 See Olsen, supra note 129, at 1498-99 (noting that despite women's successes in
the fight for equality, vestiges of subordination to men linger).
195 See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No Problem"Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1733 (1991) (recognizing that despite the substantial progress toward gender equality, women's reproductive freedom is not secure and sexual
violence and other forms of oppression still exist); see alsoJudith Olans Brown et al.,
The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in ConstitutionalDissonance, 36 Burr. L. REX,.
573, 574 (1987). This article criticizes as "misplaced" the debate between those who
claim women do not need special treatment to attain equality and those who purport
that equality demands that the law recognize women's social significance. Id. The
author argues that neither view can adequately redress women's social oppression
because neither the legal system nor public opinion provides a stable foundation for
eradicating gender injustice. Id. This article proposes that current patterns of legal
reasoning impede equality and that only a restructuring of methodology offers hope
for justice. Id. at 641-42.
196 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectivesfrom the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 589, 602-603 (1986) (explaining that heightened
awareness of women's individuality and personal experience is part of the feminist
approach to social reform). Justice Blackmun has been instrumental in championing
the personal experiences of women and enlightening social consciousness on the
path to gender equality. See Sensitivity for Downtrodden, supra note 9, at 15A (discussing
the Justice's role in the emancipation of women).
197 See Ginsburg, supra note 89, at 692 (quotation omitted) (applauding Justice
Blackmun's role in women's freedom from "role-typing"); see also Book Note, 82
MicH. L. REv. 713, 716 (1984) (reviewing BARBARA MILBAUER & BERT N. OBaRErrs, THE
LAw GWTH ... LE_.AL AspEcrs OF THm ABoRTION Comovriisv (1983)) (presenting
the book's central thesis as a contemplation of the delicacy of individual freedoms in
a legal and political system that is not representative of those people whose rights it
guarantees).
198 See Karlan, supra note 4, at 536-39 (celebrating the Justice's advocacy of the
rights of women and homosexuals).
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tive march to independence.199 An understanding of the full measure of the Justice's endowment to women's issues is a vision only
hindsight can illuminate. 200 As- the Justice takes his final bow and
the confetti settles around the JE.B. decision, women eagerly await

199 Id.; see Mary Deibel, Philosophy of Court Unlikely to Change, CLEVELAND PLAIN

Apr. 7, 1994, at 15A (quoting Blackmun regarding his tenure on the Court:
"'I haven't changed. The court's changed under me'").
200 Id. Howard suggested that the philosophical disposition of the Supreme Court
will likely remain the same with the retirement of Justice Blackmun and the appointment of a new justice. Id. ContraJoan Biskupic, A Gentler Court Confirmation Process
Emerges-Low-Key Hearingsfor Clinton Nominees Could Change Public Attitudes, Scholars
Sugges WAsH. Posr, July 18, 1994, at A7 (suggesting that newly-appointed Justice
Steven G. Breyer may sway the Court a bit toward the right).
DEALER,
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the full realization of community participation.201 At the same
time, they question the fate of women's issues in the Court as a new
20 2
justice fills Justice Blackmun's vacancy.
Amy S. Cleghorn

201 SeeJoan Biskupic, A Different Sort of Court Awaits Blackmun Successor-Recent Terms
Marked By Aversion to Change,WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al (recognizing that the
fires of social change that raged around the 1970's Court have been long extinguished, and that as Blackmun steps down, the Court has been in a "holding pattern"
brought about by conservative control in recent terms).
202 See Helen Dewar, Breyer Wins Senate Confirmation to Top Court, 87 to 9, WASH.
POST, July 30, 1994, at A9 (noting that Steven G. Breyer, "moderate pragmatist" and
former Chief Judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, won bipartisan approval).
For further discussion of Breyer's nomination and confirmation, see Al Kamen, In the
Loop-Breyer Takes the Third, WASH. POST , Oct. 3, 1994, at A17 (noting that Steven
Breyer received the third and final swearing in on Friday, September 30, 1994); see
also Biskupic, supra note 203, at A7 (informing that President Clinton wanted a noncontroversial moderate for the Court); Joan Biskupic, Nader Criticizes Breyer, Cutler Tie
to Law Firm-ABA, Scholars Hail Supreme Court Nominee, WASH. POST, July 16, 1994, at
A3 (discussing Ralph Nader's denunciation of Justice Breyer because of the Justice's
past tendency to favor large corporate entities over individuals and small businesses);
Joan Biskupic, Breyer Gives View of How He "Judges"--JusticeRequires "Heartand a Head,"
WASH. POST, July 14, 1994, at A6 (noting Justice Breyer's philosophy that law is a
question of balance between legal precepts and emotion, and stressing the Justice's
endorsement of current abortion law and his belief that Fourteenth Amendment liberties extend beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution); Judge Breyer
on the Stand, WASH. PosT, July 17, 1994, at C6 (noting that at confirmation hearings,
Justice Breyer declined to align himself with his predecessor but promised to interpret the law with an understanding of the ramifications of his decisions); Ruth Marcus, Court Runners-Up Drew President's Warmest Praise-ClintonSettled on Breyer as Less
Risky Choice,WASH. POST, May 15, 1994, at A6 (stating that President Clinton selected
Justice Breyer, in part, because the Justice had a track record that would not offend
women's groups or democratic women in the Senate, but noting that Clinton rejected
Justice Breyer in favor of Justice Ginsburg when replacing retired Justice White).

